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“We know we belong to the Land, And the Land we belong to is 
grand!” 
– Lyrics from “Oklahoma!” by Oscar Hammerstein1 
 
These are certainly interesting political times.  There have been sharp shifts 
in voter sentiment in the last several national elections.2   In 2000, Al Gore 
secured the popular vote, but George W. Bush won the electoral vote with some 
help from the U.S. Supreme Court.3  President Bush’s reelection in 2004 ushered 
in what promised to be the strongest Republican presidency since Ronald 
Reagan, given that the Republican Party controlled both Houses in Congress.4  
However, in 2006, after military setbacks in Iraq and natural disasters at home, 
the party that seemed  ascendant two years before lost Congress to the Democrats 
in an election widely viewed as a rebuke of Bush Administration policies.5 
Subsequently, in 2008, the Democrats captured the White House and 
strengthened their congressional majorities, providing them control of both the 
Executive and Legislative Branches for the first time in close to a generation.6  
Pundits predicted a new era of progressive lawmaking.7
  
Yet, just two years later, 
                                                             
 1. OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN & RICHARD RODGERS, OKLAHOMA! 58, Act 2, Scene 4 (1943). 
 2. See infra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (deciding the results of the 2000 Presidential 
election in Florida after a contentious recount, which in turn determined the national result); see 
also John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Election of 2000, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2000 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
 4. See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, 
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-
Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Party Divisions: House of 
Representatives]; see also Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Party Division: 
Senate]; John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Election of 2004, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2004 (last visited Mar. 8, 
2016). 
 5. In 2006, a midterm election, the Republican Party lost control of both houses of Congress 
to the Democratic Party. See Bart Mongoven, The Political Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
STRATFOR (Aug. 29, 2007), https://www.stratfor.com/political_aftermath_hurricane_katrina; see 
also Party Divisions: House of Representatives, supra note 4; Party Division: Senate, supra note 
4. 
 6. See John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Election of 2008, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2008 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) 
(noting that in 2008, a presidential election year, the Democratic Party’s candidate, Barack Obama, 
was elected President); see also Party Divisions: House of Representatives, supra note 4; see also 
Party Division: Senate, supra note 4. 
 7. Reaching for a New Deal: President Obama’s Agenda and the Dynamics of U.S. Politics, 
RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.russellsage.org/research/reaching-for-new-deal-read-
more (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (“Pundits and politicians alike have compared Barack Obama’s 
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in 2010, the Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives.8
  
Although 
President Barack Obama was re-elected in 2012, Republicans strengthened their 
control over the House of Representatives and executed effective political 
blocking power in the Senate.9  The Republicans regained control of the Senate 
in 2014, making it even more difficult for the Obama Administration to fulfill 
new legislatives initiatives.10  The overall effect was years of federal political 
stalemate between the Democratic and Republican Parties.11  Evidently, the 
political symbol that best captures the electoral mood of the public in the United 
States is neither a red elephant nor a blue donkey (the symbols of the Republican 
and Democratic Parties, respectively), but rather a red-and-blue yo-yo. 
Amid these national political tremors, one of the more obscure, yet potentially 
legally significant, developments of the 2010 midterm election occurred in 
Oklahoma. 12   In a statewide referendum, voters approved a change to the 
Oklahoma state constitution, adopting restrictions on state judges which have 
subsequently been enacted in other states and could play a significant role for 
U.S. law in the future.13
  
Dubbed the “Save Our State” (“SOS”) Amendment, 
the measure forbade Oklahoma state judges from considering or using 
                                                             
ambitious policy initiatives to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, which sought to alleviate the 
economic devastation of the Great Depression.”). 
 8. See Party Divisions: House of Representatives, supra note 4. 
 9. See id. (highlighting that in 2010, during President Obama’s first term, the Democrats lost 
control of the House of Representatives); see also John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Election of 
2012, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection. 
php?year=2012 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); Party Division: Senate, supra note 4. 
 10. See Senate Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014, 12:28 PM), 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2014/results/senate; see also Jon Gregory, The Impact of U.S. 
Political Change is More than Domestic, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/the-impact-of-u-s-political-change-is-more-than-domestic/. 
 11. See, e.g., Dawson Church, Gridlockracy • [grid-lok-ruh-see] • noun, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 8, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawson-church/gridlockracy-
gridlokruhse_b_6281362.html. 
 12. See infra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
 13. Ben Armbruster, Sharia Hysteria Comes to Oklahoma: Voters Approve Sharia Law Ban, 
THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 3, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/11/03/ 
128074/oklahoma-sharia-law/; see OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  Many states in the United States 
authorize the amendment of state constitutions through a process of electoral referendum.  See 
David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 13 (1995).  The author discusses the initiative and referendum process: 
The initiative and popular referendum permit citizens to set the political agenda by 
placing statutes and constitutional amendments on the ballot . . . Using the initiative, 
voters may write statutes, and in some states constitutional amendments, which will go to 
the ballot if sufficient valid petition signatures are gathered. Initiative sponsors in states 
that provide both the constitutional and statutory initiative will often submit their measure 
as a constitutional initiative because of its “more secure” legal standing, a trend that is 
growing in at least one state. Constitutional initiatives can typically be changed only by 
a subsequent vote of the people, although statutory initiatives in most states may be 
amended by the legislature. 
Id. 
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international or foreign law, except where required to do so by federal statutes 
or treaties.14
  
The measure specifically prohibited any reliance on Sharia, the 
term popularly applied to Islamic law derived from the Quran and the law of 
predominantly Muslim nations. 15
  
This specific limitation enabled the SOS 
Amendment supporters to tap into the anti-Muslim sentiment that has been an 
undercurrent in U.S. society since the attacks of September 11, 2001,16
 
but the 
anti-Muslim stance of the SOS Amendment also opened it to constitutional 
challenge in federal court under the Establishment Clause.17 
The Amendment did not respond to any particular developments in the 
Oklahoma courts.  Rather, supporters described the Amendment as a pre-
emptive measure intended to forestall trouble.18
  
Prior to the vote, the pre-
emptive measure attracted little media attention and failed to spark significant 
                                                             
 14. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010).  The Oklahoma state 
constitutional amendment read as follows: 
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their judicial 
authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States 
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules 
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United 
States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial 
decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. 
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.  The provisions 
of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not 
limited to, cases of first impression. 
Id. 
 15. Id.  (“The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.”). 
 16. See Roger Cohen, Shariah at the Kumback Café, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/opinion/07iht-edcohen.html (characterizing Sharia as “the 
new hot-button wedge issue, as radicalizing as abortion or gay marriage, seized on by Republicans 
to mobilize conservative Americans against the supposed ‘stealth jihad’ of Muslims in the United 
States and against a Democratic president portrayed as oblivious to — or complicit with — the 
threat”); Carey Gillam, Oklahoma Judge Blocks Anti-Islam Amendment, REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2010, 
8:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/30/us-oklahoma-ruling-idUSTRE6AT2CK 
20101130 (stating opponents of the law argued “it clearly was a discriminatory measure” against 
Muslims); Newt Gingrich, No Mosque at Ground Zero, HUMAN EVENTS (July 28, 2010, 3:01 AM), 
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38282 (“[T]he radical Islamist effort to impose sharia 
worldwide is a direct threat to all those who believe in the freedoms maintained by our constitutional 
system.”). 
 17. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (challenging the 
constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute). 
 18. See Joel Siegel, Islamic Sharia Law to Be Banned in, ah, Oklahoma, ABC NEWS (June 
14, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/Media/oklahoma-pass-laws-prohibiting-islamic-sharia-laws- 
apply/story?id=10908521 (quoting State Representative Rex Duncan, a “chief architect of the 
measure,” as describing the amendment as “a necessary ‘preemptive strike’ against Islamic law 
coming to the state” and adding that he “‘see[s] this in the future somewhere in America . . . [i]t’s 
not an imminent threat in Oklahoma yet, but it’s a storm on the horizon in other states.’”). 
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local controversy.19  Instead of addressing pressing state government issues, the 
amendment appeared to have been advanced in part as a means of generating 
conservative voter turnout in what otherwise could have been a dull midterm 
election.20
  
No matter what the political calculus may have been, the Amendment 
passed with over 70% of voter support.21
  
The Amendment would not have 
affected the outcome in any pending litigation.22  Yet, had the Amendment 
survived scrutiny in federal court, it could have fundamentally altered the 
structural fabric of judicial decision-making in the Sooner State. 
The SOS Amendment failed to take effect because it was immediately 
challenged in federal court on the grounds that, by singling out Sharia for 
specific prohibition, it violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.23  In Awad v. Ziriax,24 the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Oklahoma preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the SOS Amendment, 
concluding that there was a substantial likelihood the challengers could prove it 
violated the Establishment Clause.25 
 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit upheld the injunction, and the matter was remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings.26
  
In August 2013, the district court entered 
a final injunction permanently enjoining the Amendment.27
 
In anticipation that 
the Amendment might be enjoined, the Oklahoma Legislature passed a bill that 
re-enacted the limitations by statute without the specific reference to Sharia.28  
The constitutionality of that backup measure remains unchallenged.29 
Even if the SOS Amendment had survived the constitutional challenge, it 
likely would have had minimal immediate impact on legal decisions in 
Oklahoma courts.  There was no evidence that Oklahoma judges frequently, or 
even occasionally, turned to foreign or international law in their judgments 
before the Amendment was adopted, and the Amendment was unlikely to alter 
                                                             
 19. See Armbruster, supra note 13; but cf. Dick Polman, From Paranoia to Patdowns, 
NEWSWORKS (Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php?option=com_flexicontent& 
view=items&id=8547:from-paranoia-to-patdowns. 
 20. See Polman, supra note 19 (stating that the Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment “did 
what it was supposed to do” in “boost[ing] conservative turnout” with such success that 
“Republicans are thinking of pushing similar ballot measures in other states.”). 
 21. Summary Results: General Election–November 2, 2010, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. 
(Nov. 2,  2010), http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html. 
 22. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 18 (noting that experts in the legal field were not aware of a 
United States judge invoking Sharia law to render a decision). 
 23. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. at 1301–02. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1306, 1308. 
 26. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 27. Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (W.D. Okla. 2013). 
 28. See H.B. 1060, 2013 Leg., 54th Sess. (Okla. 2013). 
 29. See Bill Information for HB 1060, OKLAHOMA STATE LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1060&Session=1300 (last visited Mar. 8, 
2016). 
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judicial behavior or outcomes in any existing cases.30  Moreover, the Amendment 
specifically permitted reference to foreign and international materials in the 
application of federal law.  It can be inferred that this exception was an attempt 
to avoid federal preemption.31  Consequently, the Oklahoma Amendment was 
more symbolic than substantive at the time of its enactment, although that 
probably would have changed over time.32 
To regard the pre-emptive measure as either a simple political maneuver or a 
symbolic swipe at Islam would miss its deeper significance.  The measure 
reflects a substantial wave of antipathy in the United States to foreign and 
international law, particularly in the nation’s politically and socially 
conservative jurisdictions.33  The SOS Amendment tapped into a widely held 
public sentiment that there is something fundamentally, and perhaps even 
dangerously, wrong in allowing U.S. courts to consider the laws of other nations, 
utilize the work of other courts around the world, or incorporate principles of 
international law into the reasoning and judgments of courts in the United 
States.34 
Subsequent events have demonstrated that what happened in Oklahoma in 
2010 was not an isolated phenomenon.  Similar measures (usually without 
specific references to Sharia) have been proposed or adopted elsewhere.35
  
The 
                                                             
 30. See, e.g., Michael Gerson, Baiting a Faith in Oklahoma, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/15/AR2010111506766_pf.html. 
 31. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.  (Okla.  2010).  Under the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, the laws of states, including state constitutions, are preempted if they conflict 
with national law.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2;  see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 551 (2001) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted 
Massachusetts’ regulations restricting tobacco companies’ outdoor and point-of-sale advertising); 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72–74 (1941) (holding that the Alien Registration Act of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was preempted by the federal Alien Registration Act enacted by 
Congress).  To avoid this fate, the “SOS Amendment” effectively permits an exception for instances 
in which state judges must apply federal law.  See Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1056. 
 32. See Gerson, supra note 30 (characterizing the “SOS Amendment” as “a novel use of 
American law — not to actually address a public problem but to taunt a religious minority.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Editorial, A Respect for World Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/opinion/03tue3.html?_r=0?register=facebook. 
 34. See id. (endorsing Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s defense of the value of 
foreign law, despite the rampant “[n]ativism in American politics[,]” as “‘add[ing] to the store of 
knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions’”);  see Richard Geldard, The Rise of 
American Exceptionalism, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2012, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
richard-geldard/the-rise-of-United States-exce_b_1103875.html; see also Stephen M. Walt, The 
Myth of American Exceptionalism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism.  See generally Robert R. Tomes, 
United States Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century, 56 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & 
STRATEGY 27 (2014). 
 35. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 57, 82d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Tex. 2011); S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 1004, 2011 
Leg. Assemb., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011); see also Sara Prasatik, Assessing the Viability of State 
International Law Prohibitions, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 465, 465–66 (2013); Jeremy Grunert, 
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constitutional amendment in Oklahoma has been followed by the enactment or 
consideration of similar measures in other states, including Arizona, Florida, 
Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Wyoming.36  Several public interest 
groups are actively pressing Congress37
 
for comparable legislative proposals 
directed at the federal courts.38  This article will refer to these measures as “Anti-
Foreign-or-International-Law” (“AFIL”) statutes and proposals.39
  
In the new 
era of conservative political backlash against what many voters see as liberal 
excess on all fronts, the claim that “liberal” courts are endangering cherished 
U.S. legal values by indulging a recently discovered penchant for reliance on 
                                                             
Comment, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia? Awad v. Ziriax and the Question of Sharia 
Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 698–99 (2013). 
 36. Other states have dropped the specific reference to Sharia.  They have also generalized 
the AFIL disability to apply to laws from any nation that lacks U.S. federal and state commitments 
to fundamental rights.  Because there are few nations in the world, however, that have precisely the 
array and extent of rights that exist in the United States, this formula actually invites wholesale 
prescription of the vast majority of foreign law.  See S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2011); S.B. 58, 2013 Leg., 155th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 
2012); H.B. 785, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); H.B. 695, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 
2013); H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); see generally FAIZA PATEL ET AL., CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES 
AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 1–4 (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ForeignLawBans.pdf (discussing AFIL statutes in various jurisdictions and 
identifying differences in statutory and constitutional language). 
 37. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Freedom L. Ctr., “American Laws for American Courts” 
Public Policy Initiative Advances in State Legislatures as AFLC Leads Citizens Awareness Drive 
(Jun. 26, 2013), http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/press-release/american-laws-for-
american-courts-public-policy-initiative-advances-in-state-legislatures-as-aflc-leads-citizens-
awareness-drive/; see also American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2016); e.g., American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign 
Laws—Including Shariah, ACT! FOR AM. (May 29, 2014, 3:36 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140828191627/http://www.actforamerica.org/index.php/learn/email-archives/3081-american-laws-
for-american-courts-protects-constitutional-rights-against-foreign-laws-including-shariah; Confronting 
the Threat of Radical Islam, THOMAS MORE L. CTR., https://www.thomasmore.org/key_issue 
/confronting-the-threat-islam/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); SANE Special Update: Material Support 
of Jihad Statute in Tennessee, SOC’Y OF AM. FOR NAT’L EXISTENCE (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:04 AM), 
http://www.saneworks.us/indexnew.php; CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN 
STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE APPELLATE CASES 1 (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2012/08/30/shariah-law-and-american-state-courts/. 
 38. See, e.g., H.R. 973, 112th Cong. (2011). 
Part VI of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:‘In 
any court created by or under article III of the Constitution of the United States, no justice, 
judge, or other judicial official shall decide any issue in a case before that court in whole 
or in part on the authority of foreign law, except to the extent the Constitution or an Act 
of Congress requires the consideration of that foreign law.’ 
Id. at § 1. 
 39. Note also that the Islamic law of Sharia has several appropriate spellings, including 
“shariah” “shari’ah” or “shari’a”.  For the purposes of consistency, this article will uniformly use 
the spelling “sharia.” 
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foreign law has struck a responsive chord with the U.S. public.40  Antipathy to 
foreign law on the political front has, no doubt, been further aggravated by recent 
Supreme Court decisions that have looked beyond the borders of the United 
States in either limiting the scope of the death penalty 41  or expanding gay 
rights.42  The AFIL proposals and measures tap into that antipathy as well. 
Antipathy to foreign law has had a noteworthy effect on the federal judicial 
appointment process.43  The last four Supreme Court nominees were closely 
interrogated by Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
regarding their personal views on the use of foreign and international law in the 
adjudication of domestic legal questions.44  Four Supreme Court Justices have 
                                                             
 40. See, e.g., American Laws for American Courts, supra note 37; see also CTR. FOR SEC. 
POL’Y, supra note 37, at 1. 
 41. Graham v. Florida., 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits a life sentence without parole for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide, 
observing that, although international law is not dispositive for interpretations of the Eighth 
Amendment, “‘the overwhelming weight of international opinion against’ life without parole for 
non[-]homicide offenses committed by juveniles ‘provide[s] respected and significant confirmation 
for our own conclusions’”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (stating that “[t]he 
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not controlling 
here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the Court’s determination that the 
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18[,]” to support the Court’s holding 
that execution of individuals under 18 at the time of their crimes is constitutionally prohibited). 
 42. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73, 576–77 (2003) (citing decisions by the 
European Court of Human Rights and other nations as evidence that the right of homosexuals to 
engage in consensual intimate activities is “an integral part of human freedom in many other 
countries[,]” in support of its decision to declare a Texas statute unconstitutional that made it a crime 
for two people of the same sex to engage in consensual sexual acts). 
 43. See Thomas C. Goldstein & Cody S. Harris, Outsourcing American Law: Foreign Law 
and Constitutional Interpretation: The Debate Behind Diatribes 8, 24 (Am. Enter. Inst. For Pub. 
Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 157, 2011), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
11/20090820-Chapter7.pdf; see also David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial 
Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2008) (highlighting that Justice Kennedy was a 
disappointment for conservatives because he “cite[d] foreign law when it supported his views”). 
 44. Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557-58 
(2007). 
Bush’s eventual nominees, Judges John Roberts and Samuel Alito, both faced close 
questioning from the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding their views on the Court’s 
use of foreign constitutional precedent.  Both nominees registered opposition to the use 
of such precedent, although they stopped short of saying that other members of the Court 
should be prevented from doing so. 
Id. at 558. 
During their confirmation hearings, Supreme Court nominees John Roberts and Samuel 
Alito expressed their firm opposition to the interpretive approach. Original leaders of the 
movement now sound more defensive than ever, as demonstrated by Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s statement from the bench conceding that, ‘I know it is not popular to refer to 
international commentary on issues like this . . . .’ 
Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 649 
(2008);  see also The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 125–27 (2010) 
(statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley); Adam Liptak, Analysis: Sotomayor on Foreign Law, N.Y. 
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openly opposed the use of foreign or international precedent in U.S. 
constitutional decisions.45  Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito 
both spoke against the practice,46  and Justice Clarence Thomas and former 
Justice Antonin Scalia registered their opposition in various Supreme Court 
opinions. 47   Prior to taking her seat on the Supreme Court, Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, then a federal circuit court judge, wrote and spoke in favor of a more 
active judicial consideration of foreign and international sources.48
  
However, 
Justice Sotomayor backtracked somewhat in her confirmation hearings by re-
characterizing her position and offering assurances that decisions in foreign 
courts would not influence her legal decisions.49  Justice Elena Kagan, whose 
                                                             
TIMES (Jul. 17, 2009, 10:56 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/analysis-sotomayor-
on-foreign-law/. 
 45. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that 
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected 
out of hand.  In fact the Court itself does not believe it.  In many significant respects the 
laws of most other countries differ from our law—including not only such explicit 
provisions of our Constitution as the right to jury trial and grand jury indictment, but even 
many interpretations of the Constitution prescribed by this Court itself. 
Id.; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of these foreign 
views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) 
is therefore meaningless dicta.  Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . should not impose 
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’” (quoting Foster v. Fla., 537 U.S. 990, n.* (2002) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of cert.))); Rahdert, supra note 44, at 558. 
 46. Rahdert, supra note 44, at 558.  (“Both nominees probably needed to oppose the use of 
foreign precedent in order to win the support of some of the Judiciary Committee’s more 
conservative members, including Senators John Cornyn and Jon Kyl.”). 
 47. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of cert.). 
 48. Sonia Sotomayor, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, How 
Federal Judges Look to International and Foreign Law Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, Speech 
Before the American Civil Liberties Union of Puerto Rico (Apr. 28, 2009), Speech to the A.C.L.U. 
of Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/ 
1194840839480/speech-to-the-a-c-l-u-of-puertorico.html. 
To the extent that we as a country remain committed to the concept that we have freedom 
of speech, we must have freedom of ideas.  And to the extent that we have freedom of 
ideas, international law and foreign law will be very important in the discussion of how 
to think about the unsettled issues in our own legal system.  It is my hope that judges 
everywhere will continue to do this, because I personally believe that it is part of our 
obligation to think about things not outside of the American legal system, but that within 
the American legal system we’re commanded to interpret our law in the best way we can, 
and that means looking to what anyone has said to see if it has persuasive value. 
Id. 
 49. See The Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 132–33, 348–49 
(2009) (statements of Sen. Thomas Coburn, Sen. Charles Schumer, and Judge Sonia Sotomayor); 
see also Liptak, supra note 44 (“Judge Sotomayor, judging by her statements at her confirmation 
hearings this week, is not willing to let foreign courts play a dispositive role in her decision-making. 
Nor is she prepared, as her two predecessors seemed to be, to close her ears entirely.”). 
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career path involved a long stint as a legal scholar and educator,50 was able to 
describe her interest in foreign law as motivated primarily by intellectual 
curiosity.51  Neither Justice Sotomayor’s nor Justice Kagan’s confirmation was 
placed at risk by their testimony, but many Senators who voted against 
confirmation cited the Justices’ interest in foreign law (and the Senators’ 
suspicions about what role it might play in their decisions) as one reason for their 
negative vote.52  It will be interesting to observe what role attitudes toward 
foreign and international law may play in confirmation hearings for Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s successor. 
The Supreme Court nominations are the tip of a much larger judicial 
appointment and electoral iceberg.  For other federal court nominations, state 
court nominations, and judicial elections in states where judges are elected,53
 
                                                             
 50. Most notably, Justice Kagan served as Dean of Harvard Law School from 2003-2009. 
Deans of Harvard Law School, HARV. LAW SCHOOL, http://hls.harvard.edu/library/historical-
special-collections/research-assistance/deans-of-harvard-law-school/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
 51. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 126 (2010) (statements 
of Sen. Charles Grassley and Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, nominated to be an Associate Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court) In an exchange, Senator Grassley asked “Should judges ever look to 
foreign law for ‘good ideas?’ Should they get inspiration for their decisions from foreign law?” 
Solicitor General Kagan responded: 
Well, Senator Grassley, I guess I’m in favor of good ideas coming from wherever you 
can get them, so in that sense I think for a judge to read a law review article or to read a 
book about legal issues or to read the decision of a state court, even though there’s no 
binding effect of that state court, or to read the decision of a foreign court, to the extent 
that you learn about how different people might approach and have thought about 
approaching legal issues. 
Id.  
 52. See Press Release, Ga. Sen. Saxby Chambliss, Chambliss Statement on Judge Sotomayor 
(Jul. 30, 2009), http://votesmart.org/public-statement/446021/chambliss-statement-on-judge-
sotomayor#.Vui5Rcc-CT- (“I am concerned about her apparent leaning to use foreign law to 
interpret America’s own laws and Constitution.”); see also Press Release, Idaho Sen. James E. 
Risch, Statement on Opposition to Supreme Court Nominee Sonia Sotomayor (Jul. 27, 2009), 
http://www.risch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=eeb421d2-91ac-4f1c-b483-
51da546a0bf2 (“Her answers to questions on the use of foreign law to interpret our Constitution did 
nothing to ease my concern that she would not look to the laws of other countries when interpreting 
the Constitution. That should not happen under any circumstance.”); Press Release, Iowa Sen. 
Chuck Grassley, Senator Grassley’s Statement for Judiciary Committee Exec. on Elena Kagan to 
be an Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Jul. 20, 2010), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/ 
news/news-releases/senator-grassleys-statement-judiciary-committee-exec-elena-kagan-be-
associate. 
Solicitor General Kagan also stated that a Justice could look to international law to find 
“good ideas” when interpreting the Constitution and U.S. laws.  I’m unaware how 
international law can help us better understand the Constitution.  When we begin to look 
to international law to interpret our own Constitution, we are at a point where the meaning 
of the United States Constitution is no longer determined by the American people. 
Id. 
 53. See Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 181 (2004). 
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any hint of affinity for foreign or international law could lead to disaster for a 
potential judicial nominee or candidate.54  As the world of U.S. judicial politics 
becomes increasingly divided and contested, with state election costs now 
running in the millions of dollars, the opposition will exploit the issue as an 
opportunity to create resistance to any candidate who even hints at an interest in 
foreign or international law.55 
Collectively, these developments reflect a vigorous new strain of a deep-
seated tendency in the political, legal, and cultural thought of the United States: 
a commitment to U.S. national “exceptionalism.”56  There are several theoretical 
arguments that have been advanced in academic circles against the use of foreign 
and international law by U.S. courts.  These arguments include claims that 
resorting to foreign law conflicts with the Framers’ original intentions in 
constitutional matters, delegates judicial authority to foreign powers, compounds 
the democratic deficit of judicial decision-making, creates selectively result-
oriented decisions, and is impracticable.57  Some of the voters who passed the 
                                                             
The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject to election.  The votes 
of the people select or retain at least some judges in thirty-nine states, and all judges are 
elected in twenty-one states.  By one count, 87% of the state and local judges in the 
United States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office. 
Id.; Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623 (2009) 
(“[M]ore than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business is handled by state courts, and 
approximately nine in ten of all state court judges face the voters in some type of election.”). 
 54. See generally Martha F. Davis, Shadow and Substance: The Impacts of the Anti-
International Law Debate on State Court Judges, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 631, 644–45 (2013) 
(discussing tendency of state judges to avoid discussion or application of foreign law even when 
permitted to do so as a result of AFIL movement). 
 55. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 
1081 (2007) (“Judicial elections have become nastier, noisier, and costlier.  Indeed, the rise in cost 
and heat is so well-known that it has become a stuck record.”); see also Davis, supra note 54, at 
646; Shepherd, supra note 53, at 642. 
The cost of [state] supreme court campaigns, especially in partisan elections, has risen so 
dramatically that it is often difficult, if not impossible, for candidates to win elections 
without substantial funding.  In 1997–1998, the top campaign fundraiser prevailed in 
approximately 75 percent of contested state supreme court races, and in 2001–2002, the 
top fundraiser won in 80 percent of the elections. Thus, with few exceptions, more money 
is a prelude to victory. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 56. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA: 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND IDENTITY FROM 1492 TO 1800 4–7 (1993); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 33–35 (1996); DEBORAH L. MADSEN, 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 35–38 (1998); Dorothy Ross, American Exceptionalism, in A 
COMPANION TO AMERICAN THOUGHT 22–23 (Richard Wightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg 
eds., 1995); Michael Kammen, The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration, 45 
AM. Q. 1, 6–11 (1993). 
 57. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term, Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 89 (2005) (“Yet the judicial systems of the United States are relatively 
uniform and their product readily accessible, while the judicial systems of the world are immensely 
varied and most of their decisions inaccessible as a practical matter to our mostly monolingual 
judges and law clerks.”); see also Rahdert, supra note 44, at 584, 635–55. 
548 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:537 
Oklahoma referendum and some of the legislators voting for similar laws in 
other states may have entertained some or all of these views.58  But aside from 
specific antipathy to Islamic law, the single argument that strongly resonates 
with public sentiment is the idea that U.S. law is so vitally different from law 
elsewhere in the world that any use of foreign or international sources in legal 
adjudication risks corrupting U.S. justice and is a betrayal of fundamental U.S. 
legal values.59 
In the United States, exceptionalist thinking is very much a part of the 
prevailing national narrative, and it has been since the nation’s founding.60  
Exceptionalists view the U.S. national experience as unique and superior in ways 
that have translated directly into U.S. legal culture.  Citizens of the U.S. 
recognize the Declaration of Independence, and the American Revolution it 
sought to justify, as formidable embodiments of our national uniqueness.61  
These citizens also believe that unique character is expressed in our national 
Constitution, 62
 
which many exceptionalists treat as a sacred text that 
encompasses a national political faith and hallowed political institutions infused 
with national culture.63  This attitude carries over to several facets of the U.S. 
                                                             
 58. See James C. McKinley, Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/us/15oklahoma.html?_r=0 (highlighting 
that the Oklahoma amendment passed with an overwhelming voter approval by seventy percent 
and State Representative Rex Duncan “predicted that Muslims would come to America to take 
away ‘the liberties and freedom from our children’”);  see also Steve Benen, Oklahoma Bar 
Imaginary Sharia Threat, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ 
archives/individual/2010_11/026460.php (noting that legislators intended the amendment “to 
prevent ‘liberal judges’ who want to ‘undermine those founding principles’ of America”). 
 59. See Rahdert, supra note 44, at 592 (finding that exceptionalists regard the “Constitution 
as unique among world organs of government[,]” and thus believe that foreign law should be 
irrelevant because the Constitution was designed to be different). 
 60. Id. at 590, 592. 
Accompanying that physical isolation was the national sentiment of uniqueness.  For 
example, American cultural tradition is closely associated with such icons as the pioneer 
spirit, manifest destiny, and the metaphor of the United States as a moral and political 
‘beacon on a hill,’ committed to the development of a transformed society fundamentally 
different in character from its European forebears. 
Id. at 590 (citation omitted); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1479, 1481 n.4 (2003) (“The term ‘American Exceptionalism,’ said to have been coined by Alexis 
de Tocqueville in 1831, has historically referred to the perception that the United States differs 
qualitatively from other developed nations, because of its unique origins, national credo, historical 
evolution, and distinctive political and religious institutions.”). 
 61. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); Constitutional Supremacy and 
American Exceptionalism, SELOUS FOUND. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., http://sfppr.org/constitutional-
supremacy-and-american-exceptionalism/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 62. See, e.g., Constitutional Supremacy and American Exceptionalism, supra note 61 
(providing an argument linking the Constitution with American exceptionalism and using the 
linkage to argue against use of foreign law in American courts). 
 63. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 200–
01 (1913). 
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legal system.  We see ourselves as a nation apart from European culture and 
history—which we broke away from over 225 years ago by declaring and 
achieving independence—and from other nations that are legally, culturally, and 
politically separate.64  Citizens of the United States regard the U.S. Constitution 
and laws as potent reflections of our fundamental difference from all foreign 
nations.65  Consequently, average voters in the U.S., and no doubt typical state 
legislators as well, have an immediate, obvious, intuitive, and almost reflexive 
answer to the question of whether U.S. courts should look to foreign or 
international law when rendering their judgments.  The answer is a resounding 
“No,” across the board, with no exceptions. 
This article examines the idea of U.S. legal exceptionalism in the context of 
the recent wave of state AFIL laws.  Part I begins with Oklahoma’s law and a 
discussion of the constitutional litigation in Awad.  This case primarily concerns 
federal constitutional principles on the separation of church and state.  However, 
in applying those principles, Awad addresses a broader question: whether 
religiously motivated strains of exceptionalist beliefs are constitutionally 
permissible.66  The courts have thus far held that such selective religious legal 
exceptionalism is constitutionally prohibited.67  This Article agrees.  It maintains 
that Oklahoma’s attempt to single out Islamic law for particular disapprobation 
represents a rare example of a constitutionally forbidden explicit governmental 
religious preference. Although the constitutional question is considerably closer, 
the Article also argues that evidence of an underlying anti-religious sentiment 
ought to defeat the constitutionality of any AFIL proposal that is directed at the 
particular exclusion of Islamic law, even if the state statute or constitutional 
amendment uses neutral wording. 
Part II turns attention to religiously neutral and thoroughly secular state laws 
that broadly prohibit judicial consideration of foreign or international principles 
of law without regard to their origin.  It is possible that such a studiously neutral 
law, which is not directed against Islam or any other religious faith, would 
survive constitutional review.  Yet although such wholesale exceptionalism may 
                                                             
The document which the convention presented to congress and to the country as the 
proposed new constitution for the United States was a surprise to everybody.  No one 
could have foreseen the processes by which it  had been constructed, and no one could 
have foretold the compromises by which the differences of opinion had been reconciled, 
and accordingly no one could have forecast the result. 
Id.; see CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 278–81 (1966). 
 64. See Rahdert, supra note 44, at 592–95 (arguing that the world watched the experiment of 
the U.S. Constitution as it “broke new ground in world political history” and departed from 
European influence). 
 65. Id. at 592 (stressing that the “Americans regard the United States as fundamentally 
different from all other nations; they also regard the Constitution as unique among world organs of 
government.”). 
 66. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 67. See infra Part I. 
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avoid the restrictions of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, it is 
nonetheless unwise and contrary to long-established U.S. legal tradition.  
Because existing legal doctrines carefully regulate the operation of foreign or 
international law in domestic adjudication, U.S. exceptionalism is unnecessary.  
It is also unworkable, undesirable, and probably unenforceable in an 
increasingly globalized legal world. 
Wholesale exceptionalism contradicts the longstanding tradition that state 
courts are afforded the general authority to decide all legal issues within the 
courts’ jurisdiction, regardless of the law’s source.68  It is unworkable because 
globalization has increasingly intertwined foreign and domestic legal issues, 
leaving the lines between nations progressively more indistinct.  It is 
unenforceable because courts and counsel can find ways to informally bring 
foreign or international law into the courtroom.  It is unwise because it 
contravenes important strains of comparative thinking in U.S. jurisprudence, and 
risks cutting off access to potentially valuable and essential foreign or 
international sources. Exceptionalism invites attitudes of isolationism and 
nationalism that can lead to pernicious consequences.  Finally, it is unnecessary 
because U.S. courts are fully capable on their own to sift out the rare 
circumstances in which foreign law is properly relevant to a judicial dispute in 
the U.S.  For all these reasons, courts should have the authority to properly 
decide the relevance of foreign and international law in domestic legal disputes 
without interference from the state legislatures. 
Although wholesale exceptionalism embodied in the current wave of state 
AFIL laws should be rejected, foreign or international law should not always be 
applied as equally relevant to all legal questions.  To the contrary, there are some 
areas of U.S. law where exceptional legal experience suffices to warrant 
selective exceptionalism that is not based on religious preferences or values.  Part 
III explores this idea.  Comparing and contrasting wholesale and selective 
exceptionalism explains why and how selective exceptionalism differs in both 
its premises and operation from wholesale exceptionalism.  A noteworthy 
difference is that selective exceptionalism requires active engagement with 
foreign law, while wholesale exceptionalism promotes ignorance of foreign 
legal developments.69  There are additional practical and theoretical differences, 
which will be identified and explained. 
This Article offers preliminary thoughts on the types of U.S. laws that might 
support such a selective exceptional approach and establishes some preliminary 
criteria that can be used to discern when selective exceptionalist reasoning should 
apply.  In addition, the Article argues that the proper application of selective 
exceptionalism should be left to the courts.  The judicial system possesses 
reliable means for assessing the applicability of foreign and international law, 
which it utilizes with commendable caution.  Ironically, one candidate for 
                                                             
 68. See Rahdert, supra note 44, at 641. 
 69. See infra Section III.A. 
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selective exceptionalism is the U.S. legal tradition of separation between church 
and state—the very constitutional issue that defeated the Oklahoma SOS 
Amendment in Awad.70 
The Article ultimately concludes that the states should resist the temptation to 
legislate wholesale exclusion of foreign law from the court system.  However 
politically attractive it may be, the attempt to ban consideration of all foreign 
and international law from U.S. courts serves no useful purpose.  It portends 
pernicious long-term consequences that undermine the traditional authority of 
the courts and the development of justice in the United States. 
I. BANNING SHARIA: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON RELIGIOUS 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
One curious aspect of Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment was that it involved both 
wholesale and selective exceptionalism.  The selective portion of the 
Amendment specifically prohibited consideration of “Sharia,” a term used to 
identify the legal tradition that emanates from Islamic religion.71  The Oklahoma 
Amendment commanded: “the courts [of Oklahoma] shall not look to the legal 
precepts of other nations or cultures.”72 It added: “Specifically, the courts shall 
not consider international law or Sharia [l]aw.”73 
While the Amendment permitted the courts, “if necessary,” to adhere to “the 
law of another state of the United States,” the courts could do so only if “the law 
of the other state does not include Sharia [l]aw.”74  The Amendment did not 
provide a precise definition of Sharia. 75   However, a “ballot title” that 
accompanied the proposed amendment on the ballot explained to voters that the 
Amendment “forbid[s] courts from looking at international law or Sharia law,” 
by defining it as “Islamic law” emanating from “two principal sources, the 
Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”76 
                                                             
 70. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1116 (noting that an amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the 
advocacy group Americans United for Separation of Church and State in opposition to the 
Oklahoma Amendment). 
 71. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010).  See also Carlo A. Pedrioli, 
Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, and the Constitutional Consequences of 
Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 65, 66 (2012); Frank Vogel, An 
Introduction to Law of the Islamic World, 31 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 353, 356–57 (2003) (defining 
broadly Islamic law, including the differentiation between “shariah” and “fiqh” law, as the 
governing bodies of the Muslim faith). 
 72. Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1056. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See generally id. (noting that in the Amendment there is no definition of “Sharia”). 
 76. Id. For a discussion of the many complex components that enter into the legal tradition of 
Sharia, see Samir Islam, Comment, The Negative Effects of Ill-Advised Legislation: The Curious 
Case of the Evolution of Anti-Sharia Law Legislation into Anti-Foreign Law Legislation and the 
Impact on the CISG, 57 HOW. L.J. 979, 985–89 (2014). 
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The proceedings in the district court revealed uncertainty regarding what 
would be encompassed within the term “Sharia.”  Testimony in district court 
established that Sharia is neither a specific set of legal commands, nor a formal 
legal code, but instead a flexible legal tradition that connects Muslim religious 
teaching to a variety of secular legal practices and obligations.  The precise 
content can vary from time to time, nation to nation, and culture to culture.77  
Nevertheless, the primary goal of the SOS Amendment was fairly clear: if a 
particular legal right or duty could be traced to sources of Islamic religious or 
legal culture, it must be excluded from consideration in any Oklahoma court 
adjudication.78 
Since the Amendment did not respond to any particular case or development 
in Oklahoma law, it was unclear how a Sharia principle might play a role in an 
Oklahoma judicial decision.  However, proponents of state AFIL laws have 
pointed to decisions in other states that supposedly apply Sharia principles.79  
For example, the Center for Security Policy has assembled an “occasional paper” 
which identifies approximately 50 cases from various jurisdictions, not 
including Oklahoma, that the Center claims involve the application of Sharia 
law.80  A majority of the cases concern divorce, custody, or other family law 
disputes;81 a few involve property disputes;82 and a handful involve questions of 
arbitration or contracts.83  The source for “Sharia” in a small number of cases is 
                                                             
 77. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 78. See Grunert, supra note 35, at 701. 
 79. See CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 37, at 2. 
 80. Id. at 1–25. 
 81. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); In 
re the Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of 
Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 843–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 247–
48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490–91 (Md. 2008); Hosain v. Malik, 
671 A.2d 988, 989–90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Tazziz v. Tazziz, 533 N.E.2d 202, 203–04 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1988); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 
2009); S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 
A.2d 1000, 1002–03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 627 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1993); In re Marriage of Obaidi and Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787, 788 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010); In 
re Marriage of Donboli, No. 53861-6-I, 2005 WL 1772328, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 18, 2005); In 
re Custody of R., 947 P.2d 745, 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).  For discussion of the potential uses of 
Sharia in the family law context, and why they do not threaten basic American legal principles, see 
Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are Greatly Exaggerated: What American 
Judges Really Do with Islamic Family Law in their Courtrooms, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 245, 246–
51 (2013). 
 82. See, e.g., Nationwide Res. Corp. v. Massabni, 694 P.2d 290, 292–94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1984); Karson v. Soleimani, Nos. B216360, B219698, 2010 WL 2992071, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 
2, 2010). 
 83. See, e.g., El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Ark. 2006); Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 
v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochem. Co., Inc., 866 A.2d 1, 6–7 (Del. 2005); Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 
N.W.2d 569, 570–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); In re Aramco Services Co., No. 01-09-00624-CV, 2010 
WL 1241525, at *1 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 2010); CPS Int’l, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 911 S.W.2d. 
18, 19 (Tex. App. 1995). 
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the law of an Islamic nation that has some contact to the party or dispute.84  
However, in a majority of the cases, one party disputed the applicability or 
content the opposing party offered to support a claim based on Islamic law or 
religion.85 
In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the courts found the claim based 
on Sharia to be unfounded, inapplicable, or irrelevant.86  In a few instances, a 
trial court was temporarily persuaded by the legitimacy of the claim, but its 
decision was reversed on appeal in nearly every case.87  If these cases are the 
leading evidence of a national trend toward incorporation of Sharia into U.S. 
judicial decisions, the Center’s claim of steady infiltration of Islamic law into 
U.S. judicial decisions is hardly very compelling.  Nevertheless, the mere 
assertion of claims based on Islamic law in this small set of recent judicial cases 
has been sufficient in some political circles to support of the argument that 
Muslim principles are creeping into the fabric of U.S. law.88 
Within days after the election in Oklahoma, before the Amendment could be 
certified or take effect, the SOS Amendment was challenged in Awad on 
                                                             
 84. See, e.g., Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So.2d 75, 77–78 (La. 2001) (involving Egyptian nationals 
in child custody proceedings); Charara v. Yatim, 937 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) 
(dealing with the legitimacy of Lebanese divorce proceedings in an American court). 
 85. See, e.g., Charara, 937 N.E.2d at 493–94. 
 86. See, e.g., Aleem, 947 A.2d at 502 (finding that Pakistani talaq divorce proceedings under 
Sharia law are not sufficient to constitute a divorce in Maryland); Tazziz, 533 N.E.2d at 205–06 
(remanding the case to probate court, not to uphold Sharia law, but to determine if the Sharia law 
applied by an Israeli court is substantially similar and consistent with Massachusetts law); Abd Alla, 
680 N.W.2d at 572 (separating an arbitration claim from Islamic law and limiting the matter to 
where jurisdiction is statutorily granted); Farah, 429 S.E.2d at 629–30 (deciding that a common 
law marriage was not valid under English law and inconsistent with Virginia law, therefore refusing 
to recognize the marriage simply because it took place under Pakistani Sharia law); Donboli, 2005 
WL 1772328, at *18 (upholding a trial court decision that the Iranian Civil Code for child custody 
is inconsistent with the state of Washington’s public policy). 
 87. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 842–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(reversing a trial court’s non-enforcement of a custody agreement from Lebanon based on Sharia 
law); El-Farra, 226 S.W.3d at 794–96 (holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
in reviewing an Islamic minister’s contract claim and declining to apply Islamic ecclesiastical law); 
Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *1, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) 
(reversing a trial court decision to uphold an Indian talaq divorce); S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 
426–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (reversing a trial court’s denial of a restraining order to a 
wife based on the fact that marital rape is not a crime under Moroccan Sharia law); In re Marriage 
of Obaidi and Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787, 790 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing the trial’s court’s 
application of Sharia law in deciding the validity of a mahr contract agreement, in favor of domestic 
Washington law). 
 88. See American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign 
Laws—Including Shariah, supra note 37 (advocating for the American Laws in American Courts 
models in response to the “infiltration and insinuation” of Sharia law in American courts); see also 
American Laws for American Courts Public Policy Initiative Advances in State Legislatures as 
AFLC Leads Citizens Awareness Drive, supra note 37 (citing Center for  Security Policy paper to 
argue that Sharia law is encroaching into American courts). 
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constitutional grounds.89  The plaintiff claimed the Amendment denigrated his 
Muslim religion.90  He also claimed that the SOS Amendment would interfere 
with probation of his will, because his will made specific reference to Islamic 
commands regarding charitable bequests to be implemented by his estate.91  The 
key question Awad presented was whether the Amendment violated the 
Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment by specifically 
implementing legal restrictions on Sharia and Islamic law.92  The parties also 
vigorously litigated the question of Awad’s standing to raise these claims and 
whether the claims satisfied the criteria to grant a preliminary injunction.93 
After considering and rejecting challenges to the plaintiff’s standing,94 the 
district and circuit courts focused their analysis on the Establishment Clause.  
The two courts disagreed, however, on the controlling legal standards to apply 
for the potential Establishment Clause violation.95  The district court utilized the 
general establishment test,96 set by Lemon v. Kurtzman.97  Lemon determined 
that in order for a statute to meet the requirements of the Establishment Clause 
it must: (1) have “a secular legislative purpose”; (2) have a “primary effect” that 
“neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) in operation will “not foster . . 
. ‘excessive . . . entanglement’” between religion and government.98  Applying 
this test, the district court concluded the plaintiff made a “strong showing” that 
he would likely succeed in proving that the Oklahoma Amendment violated the 
“primary effect” and “entanglement” standards.99 
With respect to the primary effect standard, the district court emphasized the 
law singled out one particular religion, Islam, and its associated legal tradition, 
Sharia, for particular disapprobation:100 
While defendants contend that the amendment is merely a choice of 
law provision that bans state courts from applying the law of other 
nations and cultures, regardless of what faith they may be based on, if 
any, the actual language of the amendment reasonably, and perhaps 
                                                             
 89. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 90. Id. at 1303. 
 91. Id. at 1304. 
 92. Id. at 1305, 1307. 
 93. Id. at 1302–05. 
 94. Id. at 1302–06 (Defendants argued that the plaintiff had not suffered “injury in fact” 
sufficient to claim standing, maintaining that the plaintiff suffered no actual harm from the “Save 
Our State” Amendment.  The court rejected this argument and stated the “plaintiff has shown that 
he will suffer an injury in fact, specifically, an invasion of his First Amendment rights which is 
concrete, particularized and imminent.”); accord Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1120, 1123–28 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
 95. Compare Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–06, with Awad, 670 F.3d at 1126–29. 
 96. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–06. 
 97. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 98. Id. at 612–13. 
 99. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. 
 100. Id. 
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more reasonably, may be viewed as specifically singling out Sharia 
Law, conveying a message of disapproval of plaintiff’s faith.101 
The court reasoned that the Amendment subjected Sharia law to two specific 
prohibitions.102  First, the Amendment prohibited any direct consideration of 
Sharia by Oklahoma courts. 103   Second, the Amendment prohibited any 
incorporation of Sharia through application of law from other states.104  The 
court determined that no other religion or religious law was disabled in a similar 
manner by the SOS Amendment.105  The consequence was a primary effect of 
inhibiting Islam within Oklahoma, and thus a violation of religious neutrality 
that the Establishment Clause safeguards.106 
The court also found the potential for unconstitutional entanglement. 107  
Noting that Sharia is more a flexible and variable tradition than an explicit set of 
laws, the court concluded that enforcement of the statute would entail judicial 
investigation to determine “the content of Sharia law, and, thus, the content of 
[Muslim] religious doctrines.”108  Such an inquiry would “entangle” the courts 
by requiring them first to identify, and then specifically to reject, the offending 
principles of Islamic law.109  This judicial action would in turn send a negative 
message regarding the content of Islam, placing its adherents in a disfavored 
position in Oklahoma law and society.110  As a result, the district court concluded 
the plaintiff made a “strong showing” that he could prevail on his claim that he 
would suffer “irreparable injury” from the Oklahoma Amendment that violated 
his constitutional right to freedom of religion.  Therefore, his request for a 
preliminary injunction was granted.111 
The Court of Appeals took a different approach.  Although the parties briefed 
the case on appeal under the Lemon standard, the court requested supplemental 
briefing on whether the strict-scrutiny standard under Larson v. Valente 112 
should apply.113  Larson is a fairly unusual Establishment Clause decision.  It 
concerned a Minnesota charitable solicitation statute that required select 
religious groups to register with the Minnesota Department of Commerce. 
Registration was based on whether or not the group received more than half of 
                                                             
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1306–07. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1306. 
 111. Id. at 1307. 
 112. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). 
 113. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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its funds “from members or affiliated organizations.”114  Religious groups whose 
contributions fell below this “fifty per cent rule” were required to register.115  
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded the law effectively exercised a 
“denominational preference[]” among religious groups based on their sources of 
funding.116  In such a case of denominational discrimination, the Court held, 
“our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict 
scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.”117  The Court struck the statute down 
because although Minnesota could show that protecting against “abusive 
practices in the solicitation of funds for charity” was a potentially compelling 
secular purpose, the law in question was not “closely fitted” to achieving the 
state’s interest.118 
In Awad, the Tenth Circuit determined that the Larson standard applied 
because the Oklahoma law explicitly singled out Muslim religious beliefs for 
negative treatment, thus imposing denominational discrimination.119  The court 
rejected Oklahoma’s argument that Sharia was mentioned in the Amendment 
merely by way of example, and that all laws from foreign sources, regardless 
of religion, would be equally prohibited.120  To the contrary, the court observed 
that the Amendment permitted consideration of law from other states, even if 
that law included foreign or international principles, unless it relied on Sharia.121  
Thus, Islam was singled out because the law did not apply with the same force 
to laws derived from any other religious source.122  The court further observed 
that domestic sources of law were not excluded from consideration unless they 
included principles traceable to Sharia.123  Domestic law drawn from any other 
religious source would be permissible. 124   As a result, the Oklahoma 
Amendment engaged in a discriminatory denominational preference that was 
even more explicit and obvious than the one applied by Minnesota in Larson.125 
Since the Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny, it held that Oklahoma must 
demonstrate that the Amendment was “closely fitted” to achieve a “compelling” 
government interest.126  On this issue, Oklahoma asserted that the law served the 
general interest of “‘determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.’”127  
                                                             
 114. 456 U.S. at 228. 
 115. Id. at 231–32. 
 116. Id. at 246–47. 
 117. Id. at 246. 
 118. Id. at 248. 
 119. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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While acknowledging this interest as a “valid state concern,” the court 
determined that it was too “general . . . to establish a compelling interest for 
purposes of this case.” 128   The court stressed that the compelling interest 
standard, at a minimum, required the state to identify an “actual problem” the 
statute seeks to address.129  In this situation, no such problem existed, because 
there was no evidence that Oklahoma courts were applying Sharia law. 130  
Appellants “admitted . . . that they did not know of even a single instance where 
an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had resulted in 
concrete problems in Oklahoma.”131  Consequently, any harm that the law might 
address was “speculative at best and cannot support a compelling interest.”132  
Additionally, in the absence of a real problem, it was impossible to determine 
whether the measure bore a “close fit” to Oklahoma’s interest, because “[o]ne 
cannot try on a glove to see if it fits when the glove is missing.”133 
Although the absence of a compelling interest was sufficient to defeat the 
Amendment, the Tenth Circuit offered “observation[s]” regarding the law’s 
tailoring.134  The court observed that the law forbade “‘considering’” foreign law 
or principles when the state’s asserted interest would presumably be satisfied by 
a narrower provision confined to “‘applying’ Sharia law.” 135   Accordingly, 
“[e]ven if the state could identify and support a reason to single out and restrict 
Sharia law in its courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly 
an exercise of narrow tailoring.”136  Although the court found it unnecessary, 
indeed impossible, to rule on this issue given the lack of concrete examples, it 
strongly suggested that a total ban on Sharia was likely to be unconstitutionally 
over-inclusive.137 
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment violated 
the Establishment Clause was eminently justified.  An underlying assumption of 
the Amendment was that Islamic law is “foreign,” and therefore not 
                                                             
 128. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130. 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1130–31. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1131. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  On remand from the Tenth Circuit, the district court addressed one further issue: 
whether the portion of the provision banning Sharia could be severed from the remainder of the law 
forbidding consideration of law from all other nations or cultures.  Applying Oklahoma law on 
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purpose in approving the ballot measure, and that there was insufficient evidence of an independent 
electoral purpose to ban all foreign law regardless of content or origin.  Accordingly, the court held 
that the entire measure should be permanently enjoined.  Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 
1206 (W.D. Okla. 2013). 
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appropriately part of the U.S. legal terrain.138  The law made this assumption 
despite the fact that millions of U.S. citizens are Muslim.139  Further, the law 
made no comparable assumption of alien foreignness with respect to law derived 
from any other faith.  By labeling Islamic beliefs as a foreign corruption of 
“proper” U.S. legal principles, the law conveyed the implicit message that 
followers of Islam have a lower status than others, and that their legal traditions 
are less worthy of judicial consideration than those of the non-Muslim 
majority.140 
Of course, the non-Muslim majority in the United States, and in Oklahoma, is 
overwhelmingly Christian.141  As many have argued, there are significant Judeo-
Christian overtones and undertones throughout domestic U.S. law. 142   For 
example, several courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have 
relied on U.S. law’s biblical legal roots as a basis for upholding government 
displays of the Ten Commandments.143  While excluding “foreign” Sharia law, 
the Oklahoma Amendment effectively permitted consideration of domestic law 
that derives from underlying Judeo-Christian legal principles, at least to the 
extent such consideration is permitted under the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses.144   By identifying and excluding Sharia as “foreign,” the 
Oklahoma Amendment carried an implicit message that at least one other legal-
religious tradition—the Judeo-Christian legal tradition—is not “foreign.” 145  
                                                             
 138. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. 
 139. See Joshua Holland, The Truth About American Muslims, THE NATION (Dec. 8, 2015), 
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 145. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 144, at 446, 448, 458; see also Siegel, supra note 18. 
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Arguably, the Sharia exclusion thus indirectly reflects the viewpoint advanced 
by some commentators that the United States is a “Christian nation.”146  As the 
Court of Appeals observed, a system that allows consideration of the legal 
traditions of Judaism or Christianity, but prohibits consideration of the legal 
traditions of Islam, is one that obviously entails denominational religious 
preferences.147  For a brief legal moment in Oklahoma that preference became 
overt, and the federal courts properly struck it down. 148   The court sent a 
constitutional message that religious exceptionalism which privileges 
Christianity over Islam is not appropriate, even if other forms of national legal 
exceptionalism may be acceptable.149  Religious exceptionalism directly offends 
our federal constitutional commitment to “official religious neutrality.”150 
Whether the back-up statute in Oklahoma,151 and the statutes adopted in other 
states that omit the specific reference to Sharia also violate the Establishment 
Clause is a more challenging constitutional question.152  Without the specific 
reference to Sharia, there is a stronger claim that the law does not single out a 
particular religious belief for disapprobation. 153   Consequently, there is a 
stronger argument that the Larson strict scrutiny standard should not apply.154  
A specific reference to a particular religion on the face of the statute, however, 
is not the only way of accomplishing a denominational preference. 155   For 
example, in Larson the statutory denominational preference stemmed from 
discrimination based on sources of funding. 156   Additionally, if the Larson 
analysis in cases involving religious discrimination resembles the treatment of 
race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, a formally neutral statute 
could be based on an unconstitutional legislative purpose to accomplish religious 
discrimination.157  In the context of state AFIL statutes, there is considerable 
                                                             
 146. See, e.g., LibertyPatriot, John McCain: Constitution Established a Christian Nation?, 
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evidence that the chief political force behind the laws is antipathy to Islam, even 
when specific reference to Sharia is omitted. 158   Under equal protection 
principles, however, proving discriminatory purpose is quite difficult. Courts 
rarely find a race-discriminatory purpose unless there is a formal race 
classification. Thus it is possible that courts considering the Larson standard 
would similarly find it inapplicable to a formally religious neutral measure.159  
This would be a particularly likely outcome if legislators avoided any direct or 
explicit references to Islam or Sharia not only in statutory language, but also in 
their legislative deliberations. 
That still leaves the general Establishment Clause standard—whatever that 
standard presently is.160  While the district court in Awad applied the Lemon test, 
supplemented with an endorsement analysis, there are reasons to believe that the 
Supreme Court may depart from the Lemon approach.  Should that happen it 
remains unclear what standard, if any, will replace Lemon.161
  
In the absence of 
definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, the best approach is to glean a few 
basic precepts from Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
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To begin that inquiry, it seems reasonably safe to conclude that regardless of 
whatever else the Establishment Clause does or does not do, it should prohibit 
the government from pursuing deliberately preferential religious policies.162  
Thus, an enactment that favors one set of religious principles over others, treats 
one set as true and others as false, or treats one set of religious principles as more 
consonant with U.S. law than others, should be prohibited.163  Conversely, an 
enactment that selectively excludes one set of religious principles because it is 
not consonant with U.S. law should also be prohibited.164  Such an enactment 
operates either as an endorsement of a particular religious-legal tradition, or as 
its opposite, a denigration of a particular religious-legal tradition.165  This type 
of disparate treatment places followers of the favored religious-legal tradition in 
a legally preferred position, while adherents to the disfavored religious-legal 
tradition are distinctly disadvantaged.166  Neither legislative approach should be 
constitutionally acceptable.167 
Evaluating the legislative intent behind a formally neutral prohibition on the 
application of “foreign” law depends on two criteria: (1) whether those enacting 
the law intended to treat one set of religious-legal principles as “foreign” and 
another as “domestic”; and (2) whether a prohibition on foreign law would 
function that way.168  If a jurisdiction adopts the view that “Christian” or “Judeo-
Christian” values are “domestic,” and thus superior, while “non-Judeo-
Christian” values are “foreign” and impermissible, thus casting them inferior, 
the foreign/domestic distinction takes on a preferential religious coloration that 
offends the separation of church and state.169  On the other hand, if a jurisdiction 
takes the view that all religious traditions are equally excluded as “foreign,” or 
that there is no distinction between foreign and domestic religious legal 
traditions, then the law would be functionally neutral with respect to religious 
beliefs. This approach would be constitutional under the Establishment 
Clause.170 
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Given the fairly deliberate stirrings of anti-Muslim sentiment underlying 
Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment and comparable legislative debates in other 
states, it is difficult to avoid the inference that AFIL proposals are specifically 
aimed against Muslims.171  Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that a state could 
carefully stick to a secular version of wholesale exceptionalism that did not rely 
on antipathy to Islam as a basis for prohibiting judicial access to foreign or 
international law.172  Some of the post-Oklahoma AFIL state statutes are at least 
ostensibly motivated by this concept.173  Some AFIL state statutes attempt to 
establish a state policy against the application of foreign law or prohibit its use 
in circumstances where a foreign legal system does not provide “fundamental 
rights” equivalent to those provided under U.S. law.174  By incorporating this 
type of statutory language, a state may be able to sustain the argument that the 
statute has nothing to do with religion, and therefore does not implicate the 
Establishment Clause in any way.175  Such  a carefully drafted and justified 
statute would likely survive an  Establishment Clause challenge.176 
II. WHOLESALE EXCEPTIONALISM 
While the Constitution forbids preferential treatment of Christianity over 
Islam, it does not prohibit preferring U.S. law over foreign law. 177  Indeed, 
constitutional democracy is founded on the notion that the people will be 
represented by their elected legislators to determine the laws that apply within 
their political community.178  The very act of legislating entails an assertion of 
domestic law’s presumptive precedence over external legal sources. 179  
Consequently, it should not offend constitutional values for a jurisdiction 
formally to prefer domestic over “foreign” law. 
In the U.S. federal system, there are some inherent structural limits on a state’s 
capacity to effectuate a thoroughgoing domestic law preference.  Federal law 
must control over state or local law, and individual states must, to some degree, 
respect and apply each other’s laws.180  Thus,  under the Supremacy Clause, 
                                                             
 171. PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1–2, 7–8. 
 172. Id. at 1–2. 
 173. Id. at 7–8, 18. 
 174. Id. at 10. 
 175. Id. at 13 (noting that “courts have developed a carefully calibrated system that ensures 
respect for [foreign] law and at the same time prevents enforcement of laws contrary to our nation’s 
public policy.”). 
 176. Id.; see also supra notes 151–72 and accompanying text. 
 177. U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause does not include foreign law as “the 
supreme Law of the Land” and thus allows domestic law to be preferred over other sources of law). 
 178. See Democracy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
democracies (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
 179. See Peter Hay, The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the 
United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 213, 215–16 (2014). 
 180. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 1. 
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states must apply federal law and give it priority over conflicting state law.181  
As the Supreme Court recognized in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 182  this 
requirement is essential to the formation of a national legal system.183  Similarly, 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states must give force to the laws and 
judgments of other states.184  Additionally, where national law incorporates “the 
[l]aw of [n]ations,” states must follow and honor relevant international principles 
that national law has absorbed.185  However, these are exceptions that prove the 
rule.186  These concepts operate within a national sovereign legal system.  In 
situations in which federal law does not apply, and where states are not obliged 
to give full faith and credit to each other’s laws and judgments, states have a 
presumptive constitutional prerogative to create domestic law and to prefer it to 
all other sources of law.187 
While states have generally enforced the precedence of domestic law, they 
have never completely excluded foreign or international legal sources.188  To the 
contrary, state courts historically operated as courts of “general jurisdiction.”189  
As long as the state courts possess proper jurisdiction over the parties before 
them and satisfy the due process “minimum contacts” requirement, they have 
been able to apply any legal principle relevant to resolve the dispute, regardless 
                                                             
 181. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 182. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 183. Id. at 340–41 (1816); cf. Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 
618–19, 627–28 (1813). 
 184. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other  State.”). 
 185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  It has long been held that international customary law can 
be incorporated into federal law.  See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900).  The 
Supremacy Clause prohibits state laws that contradict federal law, and when law is in conflict with 
international customs that have been incorporated into federal law, the states are bound to follow 
this law.  U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
 186. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause dictates the general rule that when 
federal law exists, it will be held superior to any other type of law). 
 187. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (2015).  There may be some rare 
circumstances in which a state’s refusal to honor the law of another jurisdiction would entail a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.  Thus, for 
example, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held that the states are constitutionally 
required to recognize same-sex marriages legally occurring in other jurisdictions.  Id. at 2607–08.  
While the Court did not deal directly with same-sex marriages occurring in international forums, 
the reasoning of the case would likely extend to include similar constitutional protection for such a 
marriage.  See, e.g., id. 
 188. Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 219, 227 (2014) 
[hereinafter Volokh, Foreign Law]. 
 189. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 439 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990); see also Foxhall Realty Law 
Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Sheldon 
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (highlighting that “state courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction”). 
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of its source.190  This is what courts of general jurisdiction do.191  This is what 
courts in the United Kingdom have done under the common law judicial system 
that the United States inherited.192  This is what U.S. state courts have done for 
more than two centuries. 193   As Alexander Hamilton recognized in The 
Federalist, this distinctive feature of state courts is what enabled the drafters of 
the Constitution to leave the structure and content of the lower federal courts 
undetermined.194  It is part of the bedrock of the U.S. judicial system.195 
Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment and other AFIL state measures attempt to alter 
this bedrock proposition of general state judicial authority.196  In effect, they 
command that state courts should become courts of limited subject matter 
jurisdiction that should consider and decide only matters of domestic U.S. 
federal and state law.197  The key question posed by this new and historically 
remarkable step is whether the imposition of such a domestically limited 
jurisdiction is desirable. 
A. Four Levels of AFIL 
To evaluate this question, it is helpful to recognize the four different levels at 
which AFIL statutes potentially operate: jurisdiction; rules of decision; matters 
of interpretation; and questions of evidence.198  The AFIL state statutes that have 
been enacted do not typically differentiate the four different levels. It is important 
to note that the different levels may affect judicial decision-making.199 
                                                             
 190. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 191. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text; see also infra note 192 and accompanying 
text. 
 192. Court of Queen’s Bench: British Law, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Court-of-Queens-Bench (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
 193. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 450, 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) 
(demonstrating that state courts have been courts of general jurisdiction since the founding of the 
United States). 
 194. Id. at 450, 452–53. 
 195. Id. at 451. 
The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, 
and in civil cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its 
jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part 
of the globe.  Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of legal 
discussion to our courts. 
Id. 
 196. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010); see PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, 
at 15–18. 
 197. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 198. See infra Sections II.A.1–4. 
 199. See S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); see also S.B. 58, 2013 Leg., 
155th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); H.B. 785, 2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (La. 2010); H.B. 695, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., 
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1–4. 
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1. Jurisdiction 
The broadest possible effect of an AFIL statute is to deprive state courts of 
jurisdiction in a dispute where an issue of foreign or international law may 
arise.200  Under an AFIL statute, if a plaintiff’s claim or a defendant’s defense 
arises from foreign or international law, the state court may not consider that 
aspect of the case.201  Unless that issue is completely severable from the rest of 
the dispute, the court’s inability to consider the issue may affect its competence 
to decide other matters that are integrally related to the foreign or international 
law question.202  As a result, the AFIL statute imposes a direct limitation on the 
scope of state court’s judicial power by refusing to grant the state court the 
authority to decide the entire matter.203 
The proponents of AFIL statutes may not intend such an  extensive  curtailment 
of state judicial power.  Rather, they likely expect that courts will simply excise 
any foreign or international legal issue from the case, leaving the remainder of 
the dispute intact for the state court to decide.204  Yet, that may not be the 
outcome in practice.205  A responsible court may conclude that its inability to 
address an embedded foreign or international law question deprives the court of 
jurisdiction to decide the entire matter.206  Where the foreign or international 
matter is an integral component of the case, it may be impossible or entail a gross 
miscarriage of justice for the court to decide the remaining legal issues.207  The 
court may decide that its inability to consider international or foreign law issues 
warrants abstention.208  In that event, dismissal of the entire matter for want of 
jurisdiction would be proper.209 
                                                             
 200. See Hay, supra note 179, at 215–19. 
 201. See, e.g., Ariz. S. Con. Res. 1010; see also Fla. S.B. 58; Kan. S.B. 79; La. H.B. 785; N.C. 
H.B. 695; Wyo. H.R.J. Res. 8; Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188 at 235. 
 202. See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Peter Hay, Ole Lando & Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflict of Laws as a Technique for 
Legal Integration, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL 
EXPERIENCE Book 2, 170 (Mauro Cappelletti, et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Hay, Integration] 
(addressing the limitations on jurisdiction under uniform choice-of-law rules); see also Aaron 
Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 107, 115 (2012). 
 204. See, e.g., Ariz. S. Con. Res. 1010; see also Fla. S.B. 58, 2013 Leg.; Kan. S.B. 79; La. H.B. 
785; N.C. H.B. 695; Wyo. H.R.J. Res. 8; Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 235. 
 205. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 37; see also Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, 
at 227–35. 
 206. See Hay, Integration, supra note 203, at 173–74 (highlighting judicial reluctance “to 
apply foreign law without reservation.”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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2. Rules of Decision 
A second possible effect of an AFIL statute is that it dictates a rule of decision:  
in any circumstance in which a court might face a choice between domestic and 
foreign law, the court must choose domestic law.210  This interpretation treats the 
AFIL statute as a choice of law provision, which is how Oklahoma attempted to 
characterize the SOS Amendment in its Tenth Circuit briefing. 211   This 
interpretation of the AFIL statute’s effect is considerably more modest.212  It is 
largely in line with the general tenor of U.S. choice of law principles.213  Those 
principles command a strong preference to apply state law unless there is a 
compelling reason to look elsewhere.214  With respect to foreign or international 
legal sources, the courts are expected to determine that the foreign rule is 
consonant with the public policy of the home state.215  Under this current choice 
of law approach, cases where a court might prefer to apply foreign or 
international law rather than domestic law are likely to be quite rare.216  The 
effect of the AFIL statute choice of law principle is to eliminate the option of 
looking to foreign or international sources, even in circumstances where 
traditional choice of law principles would dictate otherwise.217 
Whether such a command is wise or not will be discussed below, but at this 
point it bears noting that even if such a command makes sense, there are some 
matters that simply cannot be decided without resort to foreign law.  Thus, for 
                                                             
 210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  The rule of 
decision concept refers to any statute, law, or precedent that provides the basis for deciding or 
adjudicating a case.  See Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276, 289 (N.J. 1958) 
(identifying the concept of rule of decision as a “foundation of our jurisprudence” used to 
“determine the rights of, and prescribe rules of conduct for, all persons, and . . . to be followed and 
applied by our courts in all cases to which they are applicable.”). 
 211. Reply Brief of the Defendants-Appellants at 9–10, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1133 
(10th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-6273), 2011 WL 2309239 (arguing that the petitioner, Awad, was not 
denied constitutional religious rights by the “Save our State” amendment, because an Oklahoma 
court may still choose to consider personal preferences without specific reference to Sharia). 
 212. Contra Awad, 670 F.3d at 1128 (holding that the Oklahoma statute “present[ed] even 
stronger ‘explicit and deliberate distinctions’ among religions” than other cases the court had 
previously encountered). 
 213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6. 
 214. See id. (“A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of 
its own state on choice of law”).  See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, § 42.1. Jurisdiction: How 
Determined, in A TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 274–75 (1935). 
 215. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 3–4; see also Hay, supra note 179, at 231. 
 216. See Hay, supra note 179, at 231 (noting that choice-of-law principles will allow “court[s] 
(state or federal) to conclude that forum law applies, even where foreign law has been properly put 
in issue”); Peter Hay, European Conflict Law After the American “Revolution—Comparative 
Notes, 1-2015 EUROPEAN L. FORUM 6 (discussing role of value judgments in conflicts law and 
noting tendency of American courts to favor the law of the forum as the “better” law). 
 217. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); see also S.B. 58, 2013 
Leg., 155th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); H.B. 785, 2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); H.B. 695, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); H.R.J. Res. 8, 
61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 235. 
2016] Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law 567 
example, imagine a state court dispute that raises an issue over whether one of 
the parties owns property in foreign nation X.  The question of legal ownership 
can be decided only by reference to X’s law.  There is simply no way to 
substitute the law of the home state, or of any other jurisdiction, in place of X’s 
law on that disputed issue.  If the issue is central to the case, there will be no way 
for the state court to render a just decision without addressing and determining 
that question of foreign law.  Thus, even at the rule of decision level, the effect 
of an AFIL provision may be to prevent the state court from deciding some 
important and potentially dispositive legal issues. 
In such a circumstance, there might be a way around an AFIL statute if the 
parties were able to stipulate as to the effect of X’s law.218  The court might 
avoid the strictures of an AFIL statute simply by accepting the stipulation without 
itself “considering” X’s law.219  But it is also possible that an AFIL statute could 
be read to command that, even in the absence of dispute, the court would be 
precluded from applying X’s law.220  A court that accepted the stipulation about 
the result of foreign law and then used it to reach its decision would be 
effectively applying the foreign law in question.221  If doing so is prohibited by 
the AFIL statute, a responsible court still might have no choice but to dismiss 
the action.222 Additionally, there could be cases where the parties agreed about 
the content of the foreign law, but still disputed its application to the facts of the 
case.223   If the domestic court were to attempt to resolve that dispute over 
application, it would be impossible to avoid the conclusion that it would be 
“considering,” as well as applying, the foreign law in deciding the case.224 
3. Matters of Interpretation 
A third potential effect of an AFIL statute is to prevent the local state courts 
from using foreign or international law as an interpretive resource for deciding 
a disputed domestic-law question.225   When one looks about for a possible 
religiously neutral trigger for the AFIL movement, this aspect of the law comes 
most immediately to mind.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has been roundly 
                                                             
 218. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 430 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that U.S. and 
foreign actors may explicitly stipulate to the use of foreign law and by doing so prevent forum non 
conveniens dismissal from U.S. courts).  See generally, Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the 
Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global 
Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 888–90 (2011) (addressing the ability of U.S. and 
foreign actors to enter stipulations regarding the application of foreign law in relevant matters). 
 219. See Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430. 
 220. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010). 
 221. See Wilson, supra note 218, at 890. 
 222. See supra notes 205–12 and accompanying text. 
 223. See, e.g., infra note 238. 
 224. E.g., Davis, supra note 54, at 643 (discussing the implications of a case in which parties 
agreed to the content of the applicable international law, forcing the court to apply international 
law). 
 225. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 114. 
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criticized in politically conservative quarters for occasionally looking to foreign 
and international sources in the course of deciding domestic constitutional 
questions, such as what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or what 
liberties the due process clause guarantees.226 
AFIL statute advocates probably want to ensure that their state court judges 
do not behave in a similar fashion when deciding domestic state law questions.227  
This aspect of an AFIL provision does not have the same sort of structural impact 
as a limit on jurisdiction or on rules of decision.228  Courts are rarely, if ever, 
obliged to use foreign or international resources in reaching a decision on a 
contested domestic legal question.229  Unless a domestic law itself directly refers 
to or incorporates a foreign or international legal matter—in which case it is open 
to debate whether the foreign or international matter is still “foreign”230—
reference to law beyond the domestic jurisdiction is unlikely to be necessary to 
render a just and complete legal decision. 
The impact at this stage is not so much on the authority of the court as it is on 
the discretion of the judge.231  The legislature is not directing what type of matter 
the court can decide, but rather how the judge should go about making his or her 
decision.232  While this leaves the jurisdiction and decisional power of the court 
largely intact, it raises questions about the wisdom of legislative intervention on 
judicial independence.233  Whether or not this goal makes sense will be discussed 
at greater length below. 
                                                             
 226. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, The Use and Misuse of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, CATO AT 
LIBERTY (May 19, 2010, 8:51 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/use-misuse-foreign-law-us-courts 
(arguing against the Supreme Court’s approach of looking to foreign laws in interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 227. American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign 
Laws—Including Shariah, supra note 37. 
 228. See supra Sections II.A.1–2. 
 229. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 
53–54 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, International Law] (highlighting that “domestic courts must play a 
key role in coordinating U.S. domestic constitutional rules with rules of foreign and international 
law”). 
 230. See, e.g., supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
 231. American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign 
Laws – Including Shariah, supra note 37. 
 232. See H.B. 1060, 2013 Leg., 54th Sess. (Okla. 2013) (specifying what the court cannot base 
its rulings on, but not specifying what type of matter the judge should decide). 
 233. See, e.g., Devera B. Scott et al., The Assault on Judicial Independence and the Uniquely 
Delaware Response, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 217, 238–40 (2009); Hon. Randall T. Shepard, Electing 
Judges and the Impact of Judicial Independence, 11 N.C. ST. B.J. 26, 26 (2006); Janet Stidman 
Eveleth, Preserving Our Judicial Independence, 37 MD. B.J. 58, 60 (2004); Justice Peter T. Zarella 
& Judge Thomas A. Bishop, Judicial Independence at a Crossroads, 77 CONN. B.J. 21, 22–23 
(2003) (all discussing the difficulty of establishing judicial independence in state courts). 
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4. Questions of Evidence 
The final possible impact of an AFIL statute concerns the use of foreign or 
international law as “evidence” in the course of determining a domestic 
dispute.234  Especially in light of the proliferation of cross-border business and 
personal activities in the twenty-first century, there are many situations in which 
the determination of a domestic legal issue requires a court to make certain 
findings about a legal matter abroad.235  For example, a suit seeking payments 
under a license agreement might depend on whether the licensor held a valid 
patent under the laws of a foreign country,236  or an action for divorce and 
accompanying alimony might depend on whether the parties were legally 
married in a foreign country.237  In these circumstances, courts have sometimes 
treated the foreign legal issue not as one to be decided as a matter of law, but 
rather as a question of fact.238  Parties have been obliged to offer testimony or 
documentary evidence on the law of the foreign nation and its significance for 
the disputed facts in the domestic action.239  Under this scenario, local courts 
arguably do not “decide” the law of the foreign nation; rather, they “find” it as a 
determination of fact.240 
Whether the AFIL statutes forbid this practice is an open question, but there 
are reasons to think that such a fact-finding approach to foreign law might also 
be forbidden.  Even where the court is “finding” the law of nation X, it is still 
“considering” the law of X by determining its factual relevance, and it may well 
be “applying” the law of X if that law represents a significant component of the 
judgment of the domestic court.  To the extent a court is forbidden from even 
accounting for the law as a matter of fact, its capacity to render fair judgment in 
disputes before it may well be even further impaired. 
B. The Wisdom of Wholesale Exceptionalism 
Is it wise for a state to forbid the judges of its courts from considering and 
applying foreign law?  Although most voters and legislators might reflexively 
think the answer should be “yes,” careful examination should lead to the 
                                                             
 234. See, e.g., infra notes 236–40 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 114. 
 236. See In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942, 944–45 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (regarding the validity of a 
patent under Greek law); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 366 F.2d 238, 239 (6th Cir. 
1966) (dealing with the validity of foreign patent applications). 
 237. See, e.g., Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731, 733–34, 736–37, 742 (La. Ct. App. 2008) 
(a divorce case involving first cousins, who were married in Iran, requiring a Louisiana court to 
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 239. See Id. at 740-41; see also Siddiqui, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 146. 
 240. See, e.g., Ghassemi, 998 So.2d at 740; Siddiqui, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 146. 
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conclusion that the answer is “no.”  Previous scholarship on this topic has 
identified a range of reasons for thinking this kind of U.S. exceptionalism is 
misguided and undesirable in the context of federal constitutional 
adjudication. 241   Similar considerations apply in the context of state court 
adjudication.242 
1. False Premises 
At the outset, exceptionalist claims rest on flawed premises about the views 
of the founding generation of the U.S. regarding foreign and international law.  
The Framers of U.S. constitutional government were well versed in foreign and 
international law, and they actively attempted to incorporate what they 
understood as its best elements into the U.S. constitutional structure.243  Early 
U.S. courts relied extensively on British common law, and they continued to do 
so long after U.S. independence formally separated the two legal systems, 
making British statutes and precedents “foreign” law. 244   U.S. courts also 
frequently appealed to continental legal sources, and in appropriate cases they 
relied on what they understood to be the “law of nations,” often citing eminent 
continental international legal authorities, such as Grotius and Vattel. 245  
Prominent legal scholars, including Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor James 
Kent, advocated the idea of legal “science,” whereby the decisional law of 
distinct jurisdictions labored toward elucidation of common “universal” legal 
                                                             
 241. Rahdert, supra note 44, at 648 (arguing that exceptionalism “ignores all the common 
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 242. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 243. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
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 244. See, e.g., WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES 52–53 (4th ed. 2006); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 
67–69 (3d ed. 2005). 
 245. See, e.g., The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 278 (1814) (referring to “the law of nations” 
and Vattel in deciding what factors bear on a person’s “domicil[e]”); Brown v. United States, 12 
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 134 (1814) (citing the work of Grotius in a discussion of lawful self-defense). 
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principles.246   In short, the judges, lawyers, and legal theorists of the early 
republic did not regard U.S. law as separate and apart from European sources, 
but instead as indelibly intertwined with them.247 
This attitude permeated the U.S. constitutional order.248   As Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsberg has observed, the Declaration of Independence, which put 
forward a legal justification for American independence, appealed directly to 
collective reason and expressed “respect” for the “opinions of [human]kind.”249  
Far from being an exceptionalist document, it attempted to justify the American 
Revolution by reference to principles of “natural law” that would apply to all 
nations.250  The U.S. Constitution even more specifically refers to the “law of 
nations” as a source of law that becomes, in appropriate circumstances, part of 
the “supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.” 251   It also lists treaties with foreign 
governments, then the principal source of international law, as a variety of 
national supreme law, and it gives courts, including state courts, the power and 
obligation both to interpret and to enforce them.252  In the context of the late 
                                                             
 246. See Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 1239, Joseph Story, 
the Natural Law, and Modern Jurisprudence 2 (Oct. 23, 2013), http://thf_media.s3. 
amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/HL1239.pdf (exploring Justice Story’s opinion on the existence of 
natural law and the universality of legal doctrines); John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the 
History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 567–69 (1993) (explaining Chancellor Kent’s 
view of law as a science, as well as his views on universal/ natural laws). 
 247. Langbein, supra note 246, at 566–67. 
 248. See infra notes 249–55 and accompanying text. 
 249. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, “A Decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law (Apr. 1, 2005, in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351, 352 (2005). 
The drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence cared about the opinions of 
other peoples; they placed before the world the reasons why the States, joining together 
to become the United States of America, were impelled to separate from Great Britain. 
The Declarants stated their reasons out of ‘a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.’ 
To that end, they presented a long list of grievances, submitting the ‘Facts’ - the ‘long 
Train of [the British Crown’s] Abuses and Usurpations’ - to the scrutiny of ‘a candid 
World.’ 
Id. 
 250. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (maintaining that “the Laws 
of Nature and of Nature’s God”  are the source of natural rights); see also Natural Law: The 
Ultimate Source of Constitutional Law, NAT’L CTR. FOR CONST. STUD., https://www.nccs.net/ 
natural-law-the-ultimate-source-of-constitutional-law.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (noting that 
that Founders alluded to a higher law as the ultimate source “to protect . . . natural rights for all of 
mankind.”). 
 251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define and punish . . . [o]ffen[s]es against the [l]aw of 
[n]ations”); id. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 
118 (1804) (declaring that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 
(1815) (stating that, absent a contrary statute, “the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a 
part of the law of the land.”). 
 252. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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eighteenth century, these deliberate efforts to draw explicit connections between 
domestic and international law were remarkable legal innovations that reflected 
a strong internationalist perspective shared by the Framers of the Constitution.253 
Early Supreme Court jurists also shared Enlightenment beliefs about natural 
law and justice that led them both to seek and demonstrate alignment between 
the reasoning in their judicial opinions and foreign or international sources.254  
Indeed, international and foreign law formed a recurring component of Supreme 
Court reasoning and adjudication during the first several decades of the 
existence of the United States.255  If original constitutional intention, and the 
early practices of our courts, have any notable bearing on the question of whether 
U.S. courts should consider and, when appropriate, apply foreign or international 
law, they should count in favor of, not against, the practice.256 
                                                             
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
 253. See Ginsburg, supra note 249 (“In writing the Constitution, the Framers looked to other 
systems and to thinkers from other lands for inspiration, and they understood that the new nation 
would be bound by ‘the Law of Nations,’ today called international law.”). 
 254. See, e.g., The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 278 (1814); Brown v. United States, 12 
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 134 (1814); see also MARK DAVID HALL, JUSTICE, LAW, AND THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF JAMES WILSON, FIRST PRINCIPLE 
SERIES REPORT NO. 26 3–5 (June 1, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2009/06/justice-law-and-the-creation-of-the-american-republic-the-forgotten-legacy-of-james-
wilson (describing Justice James Wilson’s views on natural and divine law and their application to 
American law); Walter H. E. Jaeger, John Marshall: The Man, The Judge and The Law of Nations, 
8 AM. U. L. REV. 28, 31–33 (1959) (overview of Chief Justice John Marshall’s views on natural 
law and the law of nations, and his application of these ideas to American jurisprudence). 
 255. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign 
Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2007). 
Citation of foreign law did not merely reflect the paucity of relevant domestic precedent.  
Rather, it reflected a deeply held understanding of law, in which background legal 
principles did not derive from any particular jurisdiction.  Such background principles 
percolated through specific legal systems, filling gaps and providing context for positive 
enactments such as statutes and written constitutions.  Given this understanding of law, 
frequent citation of foreign legal authority inevitably resulted from the implementation of 
transnational legal principles. 
Id.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and 
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 753, 760, 782 (2005) (documenting the Court’s historical practice 
of citing foreign law in decisions). 
 256. Calabresi and Zimdahl have argued, in terms of federal constitutional adjudication, that 
utilization of foreign and international legal sources has a stronger historical pedigree and may be 
more appropriate in some contexts (for example determinations of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment or determinations of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment) than 
it is in others (such as substantive due process).  See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 255, at 755–
56. While the author might not personally agree on the precise specifics of this observation 
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2. Overbreadth. 
In addition to being based on false premises about the Founders’ views of 
foreign law, wholesale exceptionalism, as it is usually argued in the U.S., entails 
a variety of difficulties that arise from its reflexive and undiscriminating 
invocation.257   Those who rely on U.S. exceptionalism typically paint their 
position with unusually broad and sweeping strokes.258  They rarely make any 
effort to substantiate the claim that exceptional circumstances have influenced 
particular legal developments, and they almost never draw explicit legal 
connections between purportedly unique aspects of U.S. law, culture, or society, 
and the specific legal issues that they maintain are unique.259  They also typically 
ignore any questions of degree,260 and they dismiss as irrelevant any influence 
that U.S. law has or should exercise on foreign sources or foreign 
adjudication.261 
This undiscriminating treatment of all foreign and international law 
adjudication as equally suspect, and presumptively prohibited, seems massively 
overbroad, even in regard to the probable intentions of the voters and legislators 
who support it.262  As the Tenth Circuit observed in Awad, AFIL laws typically 
prohibit consideration of foreign or international law when the legislature’s 
choice of law interests are concerned not with which law will be considered, but 
with which law will be applied.263  Even with respect to application, there are 
probably many instances in which the specific application of foreign law called 
for in a particular case poses no discernible threat to the domestic legal edifice, 
                                                             
regarding constitutional law, their position is roughly consistent with the distinction drawn in this 
article between wholesale and selective exceptionalism. 
 257. See, e.g., Rahdert, supra note 44, at 589. 
 258. This is especially prevalent among some highly conservative political groups that advocate 
for AFIL statutes, where Islam is portrayed as inherently contrary to fundamental American values 
and beliefs.  See generally Press Release, Am. Freedom L. Ctr, supra note 37; American Laws for 
American Courts, supra note 37; American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional 
Rights Against Foreign Laws–Including Shariah, supra note 37; Confronting the Threat of Radical 
Islam, supra note 37; SANE Special Update: Material Support of Jihad Statute in Tennessee, supra 
note 37. 
 259. Cf. Andrew Kohut & Bruce Stokes, The Problem of American Exceptionalism, PEW RES. 
CTR. (May 9, 2006), http://www.pewresearch.org/2006/05/09/the-problem-of-american-
exceptionalism/. 
 260. To the typical exceptionalist, for example, English law and Islamic law, both being 
“foreign,” are equally irrelevant to U.S. law, even though much U.S. law is based on English 
sources, and the U.S. and U.K. share hundreds of years of common law development. 
 261. See generally American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against 
Foreign Laws-Including Shariah, supra note 37; Press Release, Am. Freedom L. Ctr., supra note 
37; American Laws for American Courts, supra note 37; CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 37; SANE 
Special Update: Material Support of Jihad Statute in Tennessee, supra note 37; Confronting the 
Threat of Radical Islam, supra note 37 (all lacking any discussion of American influence on foreign 
sources, instead focusing exclusively on the negative effects they believe foreign law would have 
on American jurisprudence). 
 262. See Islam, supra note 76, at 981–82. 
 263. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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yet may well be necessary to the resolution of an otherwise domestic legal 
matter. 
Consider, for example, a probate case in which a testator purports to distribute 
a property he or she claims to have owned in Morocco.  Whether or not the 
testator owns the property is a matter of Moroccan law which simply cannot be 
determined any other way.  Yet a state probate court, in a jurisdiction with an 
AFIL statute, might be unable to determine ownership if it were prohibited from 
considering the Moroccan law needed to do so, and hence it would also be unable 
to enforce the relevant provisions of the testator’s will.  It is doubtful that voters 
or legislators supporting an AFIL statute would intend to deprive state courts the 
authority to act in such a situation, yet that is the potential impact of such a law. 
3. Non-necessity and Inefficiency 
Rather than eliminating all consideration, or even all application of foreign 
law, the more immediate concern of voters and legislators likely has to do with 
an entirely different sort of situation—one in which state courts face a legitimate 
choice between applying a domestic or a competing foreign legal principle.264  
The cases of alleged state court judicial abuse almost always involve situations 
in which the court supposedly failed to apply a domestic legal principle, 
deferring instead to a foreign legal principle.265  Supporters of AFIL provisions 
want state courts always to choose the domestic alternative.266 
How necessary or wise that command may be should depend on one’s views 
regarding the content and operation of existing choice of law principles and the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.267  Choice of law principles already have a 
strong built-in bias for domestic law in most situations.268  Initially, choice of 
law principles only raise the possibility of resorting to foreign or international 
law in circumstances involving “true conflict,” in which the competing 
                                                             
 264. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
 265. The most prominent example of this is in the much-contested case, S.D. v. M.J.R., 
involving a Moroccan couple living in New Jersey. 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2010).  
Though her husband had repeatedly raped his wife, the district judge refused to grant the wife a 
restraining order, based at least in part on the ground that marital rape is not a crime under Moroccan 
Sharia law.  Id. at 417–18.  Even though the district court decision was promptly overturned on 
appeal, the case became the center of a media firestorm, with AFIL statute supporters citing the 
decision as wrongly applying foreign law over domestic statutes and public policy.  See, e.g., Abed 
Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, THE NATION (Jun. 14, 2012), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/true-story-sharia-american-courts/. 
 266. Hay, supra note 179, at 234. 
 267. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 116–17 (discussing the contradictory relationship among 
choice-of-law clauses, the concept of forum non conveniens, and recent AFIL statutes); Walter W. 
Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law in 
Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1180–82 (2005) (providing a broad overview 
of forum non conveniens and its relationship to the application of foreign law in U.S. courts); 
Wilson, supra note 218, at 897-99 (discussing a court’s ability to hear issues relating to international/ 
foreign law in light of forum non conveniens principles). 
 268. See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text. 
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principles would lead to different standards and results.269  In circumstances in 
which a true conflict exists, the proponent of the foreign law provision must 
make a strong showing both that it has a closer connection than the local law to 
the underlying dispute, and that it is consistent with domestic public policy.270  
Moreover, in many circumstances in which foreign law might potentially apply, 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens might also apply, causing the U.S. court 
to defer to adjudication by a foreign tribunal that is better situated to resolve the 
dispute.271  In the rare circumstance where the U.S. court retains jurisdiction, 
foreign law applies under these principles, and the domestic court is a proper and 
convenient forum, the court will apply foreign law only if it has a compelling 
reason.272  Usually this reason will be the type that, if the situation was reversed 
and a foreign court was asked to apply the law of the particular state, the state 
would want the foreign jurisdiction to do so.273 
In these limited circumstances, U.S. courts have long embraced principles of 
international “comity,” which they share with foreign courts, thus enabling the 
domestic court to respect and apply the foreign law when it is just and necessary 
to do so.274  Comity principles function on an international level in a manner that 
is loosely analogous to the principles of interstate comity required by the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.275  However, except where these international comity 
principles form a part of federal law, are enforceable under the Supremacy 
Clause, or are necessary to due process, they are not constitutionally 
                                                             
 269. See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Resolving International Conflict of Laws by Federal 
and State Law, 2 PACE Y.B INT’L L 67, 73–74 (1990). 
 270. See, e.g., id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1971). 
 271. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259–61 (1981) (upholding a district 
court decision to enforce the doctrine of forum non conveniens removing a case to be tried in 
Scotland); see also Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 116–17; Heiser, supra note 267, at 1178; Wilson, 
supra note 218, at 898. 
 272. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the district court should not have dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds). 
 273. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as 
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 33 (2010). 
 274. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3–4 (1991) 
(defining comity as “a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between 
sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or ‘considerations of high international 
politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations.’”); 
Childress, supra note 273, at 13–14 (providing a broad overview of international judicial comity); 
Arif S. Haq, Kaepa Inc. v. Achilles Corp.: Comity in International Judicial Relations, 22 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 365, 366–67 (1996) (providing an overview of judicial comity and the 
domestic case law surrounding this concept). 
 275. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides that “[f]ull [f]aith and [c]redit shall be given in each 
state to the public [a]cts, [r]ecords, and judicial [p]roceedings of every other [s]tate.” Judicial comity 
is defined as the “[p]rinciple in accordance with which courts of one state or jurisdiction give effect 
to laws and judicial decisions of another state out of deference and respect, not obligation.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990). 
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mandatory. 276   Nevertheless, as courts throughout the nation have long 
recognized, they make good sense and contribute to the fair, smooth, and 
efficient administration of justice.277 
While the principles of judicial comity and reciprocity toward foreign law 
mentioned above have long been a part of the U.S. choice of law framework, 
they are rarely invoked, and even more rarely applied in ways that lead a 
domestic court to interpret and apply a foreign law provision.278  Instead, for 
good reason, courts typically do their best to find ways to minimize the necessity 
of having to decide or implement foreign law.279  Foreign law is, by nature, 
unfamiliar and uncertain.280  It may also be difficult for U.S. courts to identify 
and access.281  Even where foreign legal rules or principles can be successfully 
identified and articulated, proper contextualization of foreign law can be 
challenging and highly contestable.282  For these reasons, among others, U.S. 
courts are customarily leery of delving deeply into foreign law, so their 
applications of  state choice of law principles naturally gravitate toward domestic 
law in most situations.283 
                                                             
 276. See Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(“Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an 
imperative or obligation.”); Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of 
International Judicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using Transnational Discovery and Breard 
Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 591, 600–01 (discussing the non-mandatory nature of international 
judicial comity). 
 277. See, e.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476–77 (7th Cir. 2000) (using 
judicial comity in balancing a foreign judgment in light of an international notion of due process); 
Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exps. Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 601–04 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying the 
principle of judicial comity in the matter of a forum selection clause). 
 278. Cf. Childress, supra note 273, at 44. 
 279. See Sarah M. Fallon, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and Maintaining 
Comity Within American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 164–66, 176 (2013) 
(discussing inconsistency between AFIL statutes and principles of international comity).  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has shown historical hesitancy to engage in contested interpretation of foreign 
law on matters that might potentially affect U.S. foreign affairs.  See, e.g., Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]ourts are generally ill equipped to assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations 
with that of our own.  Although transnational litigation is increasing, relatively few judges are 
experienced in the area and the procedures of foreign legal systems are often poorly 
understood.”); cf. First Nat’1 City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) 
(deferring to the federal executive branch on application of the “act of state” doctrine because of its 
“primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs”); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman 
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (courts need to be cautious in adjudicating matters impacting 
foreign affairs because they involve “decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, 
facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power”). 
 280. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 279, at 176 (specifically highlighting that several judges are 
unfamiliar with Islamic law). 
 281. See, e.g., id. at 176–77. 
 282. See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 283. See Hay, Integration, supra note 203, at 170–71 (discussing the difficulty in ascertaining 
foreign law under uniform conflict-of-law rules). 
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Even where they admit foreign principles, the rules for choice of law retain a 
filter that allows the domestic court to reject the application of any foreign 
principle or rule if applying it produce results inconsistent with the policies of the 
home jurisdiction, or that would contravene fundamental justice.284  This caveat 
ensures that state courts in the United States are rarely, if ever, put in the position 
of applying a specific foreign legal command that is substantially at odds with a 
basic premise of U.S. legal culture.285 
Because of these built-in safeguards, broad proscription of consideration of 
foreign law by way of an AFIL statute is inefficient and unnecessary.  It is 
inefficient because, in those rare situations when courts resort to a foreign legal 
rule, prohibition of using that rule will complicate litigation, thus forcing courts 
and parties to develop elaborate ways to subtly incorporate the foreign law rules, 
or to litigate in multiple forums, or to avoid litigation in a U.S. court entirely, 
even when it is otherwise the most appropriate forum for the case.286  The parties 
may, for example, find it necessary to litigate the foreign law issue in a foreign 
court, then try to bring the outcome into the domestic litigation by way of res 
judicata, issue preclusion, or a joint stipulation regarding the result.287  The 
parties might also try to convert the foreign legal issue into a putative question 
of “fact” by employing expert testimony.288  There may be other alternatives as 
well.289 
Forcing litigants to engage in these sorts of measures seems unnecessary.  The 
existing domestic filters that inhibit truly inappropriate use of foreign laws are, 
by long historic demonstration, adequate to preventing the miscarriage of justice 
through ill-considered or unwarranted reliance on foreign law.290  These filters 
permit the introduction of foreign law when it is truly discernible, relevant, and 
potentially significant or determinative.291  C onve r se l y ,  these filters exclude 
                                                             
 284. See Pravis Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854–56 (2d Cir. 
1997) (outlining both the concept of international comity and its limitations); Allied Bank Int’l v. 
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to extend the 
doctrine of international comity when doing so would go against U.S. policies); see also Laker 
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign 
act.”); Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that 
“comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation” and refusing to apply this 
doctrine when it would contradict the interest of the applying nation). 
 285. See Laker Airways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 937. 
 286. See, e.g., Volokh, Foreign Law, supra 188, at 234. 
 287. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 430 (10th Cir. 2006); see also In re Int’l Bechtel 
Co. Ltd. v. Dep’t of Civil Aviation of the Gov’t of Dubai, 300 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 288. Wilson, supra note 218, at 901. 
 289. See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 267, at 1190. 
 290. See Pravis Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854–56 (2d Cir. 
1997); Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985); 
see also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937; Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 
435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 291. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
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foreign law when it is indecipherable or unnecessary, is difficult to 
contextualize, leads to absurd or pernicious consequences, or is unjust.292 
4. Uncertainty 
An additional objection to AFIL measures is their uncertain application.  Short 
of overt reliance on specific unadorned foreign or international legal “rules of 
decision,” or explicit treatment of foreign legal adjudications, both of which 
seem unquestionably to be forbidden, what exactly does such a measure 
prohibit?  Does the measure, for example, prohibit relying on a legal rule that is 
domestic but has its origins in foreign law?  Does it prohibit reference to a 
foreign decision discussing a legal principle that is shared with or overlaps 
domestic law?  To put the matter somewhat differently, at what point does a 
principle that has its origins, or that finds expression in international or foreign 
law, get sufficiently “domesticated” so that it is no longer “foreign?” 
One area where these types of questions can arise is tort law, a subject the 
author has taught throughout his academic career.  Most principles of tort law 
derive from common law, and they are embraced not only in the United States, 
but also by other common law nations, including Canada, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom.293  When law students in the United States learn tort law, some 
of the decisions that they study come from these other nations because they 
adhere to the same basic tort law followed in the United States, and the decisions 
of foreign courts often effectively illustrate shared guiding tort principles.294  
When this happens, is foreign law being taught, or is it just being used to 
illustrate and better understand well-established U.S. legal standards?  What if a 
particular decision from a foreign jurisdiction happens to have been cited and 
relied upon by a U.S. court, or formed the basis for the enactment of an U.S. 
statute, or influenced the development of a home-grown “blackletter” principle 
in one of the American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts?  If that decision 
                                                             
 292. See Pravin, 109 F.3d at 854–56; Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522; see also Laker Airways, 
731 F.2d at 937; Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440; Hay, supra note 179, at 231–33. 
 293. See Lewis N. Klar, The Impact of U.S. Tort Law in Canada, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 359, 359 
(2011). 
 294. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.) (English case first 
introducing the concept of the reasonable person in tort law); Davies v. Mann, [1842] 10 M. & W. 
546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 589 (Exch.) (English case establishing what would later become known as 
the “last clear chance” doctrine of negligence law); Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 
156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex.) (English case holding that a party can only be held liable for 
negligence when failing to exercise the care a reasonable person would be expected to use); In re 
Polemis & Furniss, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 KB 560, 577 (C.A.) (U.K. admiralty case holding that 
a defendant can be held liable for all consequences flowing from a wrongful act regardless of 
foreseeability); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (Wagon Mound No. 1), 
[1961] App. Cas. 388, 422 (P.C.) (U.K. Privy Council case holding that a party can only be held 
liable for reasonably foreseeable damages); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller S.S. Co. 
(Wagon Mound No. 2), [1967] 1 App. Cas. 617, 643 (Privy Council case holding that loss is 
recoverable where the magnitude of possible harm is so great that a reasonable man would guard 
against it, even if the likelihood of the harm occurring is very small). 
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is taught in the classroom, is it U.S. law that the professor is teaching, or has the 
professor ventured onto potentially “dangerous” foreign ground? 
The challenge of sorting foreign from domestic law in adjudication is likely 
to raise comparable difficulties.  It will be necessary for courts attempting to 
implement an AFIL statute to determine how prominent foreign legal sources 
must be to turn an otherwise permissible domestic legal principle or rule into an 
impermissible foreign one, and conversely how far in the background foreign 
legal sources can be without “polluting” an otherwise domestic legal principle 
with impermissible foreign content.295  The prospects for confusion about what 
may and may not be considered by state courts under such an AFIL regime seem 
substantial.296 
5. Unenforceability 
There may well be another circumstance motivating AFIL provisions.  Voters 
and legislators likely do not want state courts, when considering an unresolved 
issue of domestic law, to be influenced by decisions of comparable questions by 
foreign courts.297  This has been the chief objection to the use of foreign law in 
the U.S. constitutional sphere.298  For example, when U.S. exceptionalists object 
to references to foreign and international law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
regarding the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment,299  they typically argue that the Supreme Court should pay no 
regard to what forms of punishment foreign nations allow and disallow.300  They 
also claim that foreign decisions on matters such as gay rights, marriage equality, 
affirmative action, or other human rights questions ought to be irrelevant to U.S. 
constitutional adjudication on similar issues.301  Supporters of AFIL provisions 
may want to forestall any risk that state courts will be similarly influenced by 
foreign law principles on similar questions.302 
                                                             
 295. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1 (noting that AFIL statutes “are so broadly phrased” 
which “could result in years of litigation as state courts struggle to construe what these laws actually 
mean . . . .”). 
 296. This problem will be particularly acute with laws emanating from other common law 
jurisdictions, but it will exist with respect to law from other non-common-law nations as well, 
particularly as overlaps in areas of public law, business law, environmental law, and administrative 
regulation converge through globalization. 
 297. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the 
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1410–11 (2006). 
 298. See id. (noting that “the popular culture of the United States is extremely hostile to the 
idea that the meaning of our Constitution should be based in any way on foreign law.”). 
 299. See id. at 1413; see also Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts: Could it 
Jeopardize American Constitutional Rights?, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/23/foreign-law-in-
american-courts-can-it-jeopardize-american-constitutional-rights/. 
 300. See Calabresi,  supra note 297,  at  1413.  
 301. E.g., id. at 1398, 1411. (arguing that the exceptional nature of the U.S. legal system makes 
comparison to other legal system frequently irrelevant). 
 302. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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As to federal questions that come before the state courts, any state law that 
attempts to proscribe reference to all such foreign or international legal resources 
is probably unenforceable.  In the arenas in which federal law–whether by 
statute, treaty, constitutional principle, or authoritative federal court decision–
incorporates, requires, or encourages the consideration or application of foreign 
law, state legislatures should be powerless to prohibit it. 303   In these 
circumstances, if foreign law bears on the interpretation and application of 
federal law, the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to use it.304  As Testa v. 
Katt 305  held, where a state court is competent to hear a claim or defense 
involving federal law, it is obligated to treat that claim in the same way and with 
the same force as any federal court would.306  What federal law requires is 
binding on the state court and cannot be ignored.307  If federal law is based on, 
or calls for application of, foreign or international legal rules or principles, state 
courts that otherwise possess capacity to decide the matter in question should be 
obliged to apply those rules or principles in their adjudication.308 
Additionally, where federal statutes or treaties incorporate and apply 
international law, those principles become part of the national legal edifice that 
binds state courts.309  State law prohibiting reliance on foreign or international 
principles with respect to that portion of federal law would be unenforceable 
under the doctrine of federal preemption.310 
As to purely state law questions, formal proscription of resort to foreign law 
is permissible but is subject to dilution or evasion through legal interpretation.311  
While it may be possible to prohibit courts from citing foreign law for state law 
purposes, it seems virtually impossible, without kinds of surveillance that would 
seriously threaten judicial independence, to prevent a judge from consulting 
foreign sources.312  Where a foreign rule has a U.S. cognate or overlaps with 
existing U.S. law, it should be relatively easy for courts to avoid the appearance 
of reliance on foreign law by simply reading the same content into U.S. law 
                                                             
 303. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 113. 
 304. Id. 
 305. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 306. Id. at 392–93. 
 307. See id. 
 308. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 113. 
 309. See id. 
 310. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (the basis for federal preemption stems from the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution); see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (quoting 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (“Consistent with [the Supremacy Clause], we 
have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are ‘without effect.’”). 
 311. Cf. Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 243 (noting that AFIL state statutes are “not 
harmful . . . but neither are they particularly useful” because they will not prevent a court from 
constitutional violations). 
 312. See Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 675 (2007). 
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counterparts.313  A judge who was persuaded by foreign law might, without ever 
admitting the true source of his or her thinking, “convert” the foreign rule or 
principle into an ostensibly domestic one by simply “interpreting” an existing, 
and sufficiently general, domestic legal rule or principle to include the same 
content as the foreign source.314  Even the late Justice Antonin Scalia, who was  
the most ardent exceptionalist on the Supreme Court prior to this death, 
acknowledged that his colleagues must be left free to “look” at foreign law, 
although he preferred that they refrain from “citing” or relying on it directly.315 
Such a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to foreign law, however, invites a kind 
of judicial subterfuge that is inconsistent with U.S. concepts of judicial power.316  
Part of what we expect from the courts is that they will openly and transparently 
acknowledge the sources and grounds for their decisions.317  The public expects 
the courts to give the real reasons for their decisions, and to put those reasons on 
a public record that opens them to evaluation and criticism by higher courts, 
legislators, the legal profession, and the public at large.318  Legal rules that invite 
the judiciary to hide or disguise what they are actually doing are inconsistent 
with this tradition.319 
                                                             
 313. Id. at 651 (highlighting that Chief Justice Roberts encouraged judges that utilized foreign 
law “‘to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, [and] cloak them with the authority of 
precedent.’”). 
 314. Id. at 655–56, 658. 
 315. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation 
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 541 (2005). 
 316. See Parrish, supra note 312, at 650 (highlighting that applying foreign law “invites ‘judges 
to ‘troll deeply . . . in the world’s corpus juris’ to reach a politically preferred outcome’” which is 
inconsistent with the proper role of the judiciary system). 
 317. See Id. at 674–75. 
The U.S. Supreme Court should cautiously continue to cite to foreign law because an 
essential part of judging is citing to authority that the justices use to arrive at their 
decisions.  Our legal system is imbued with the tradition that judges must justify their 
holdings.  In doing so, they must be candid and honest in revealing the sources, and 
stating the reasons, for their decisions.  Transparency is important.  The public is entitled 
to know why the Court ruled a particular way and to be provided the opportunity to 
subject the reasoning to scrutiny. 
Id.; The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation 
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 315, at 540 (quoting Justice 
Breyer as saying, “If the foreign materials have had a significant impact on my thinking, they may 
belong in the opinion because an opinion should be transparent. It should reflect my actual 
thinking.”).  See generally Edward H. Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 
395 (1965). 
 318. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District 
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 727 (2007) (discussing the importance of written 
opinions in ascertaining judicial reasoning); see also Levi, supra note 317, at 406–07.  See generally 
William Domnarski, Judges Should Write Their Own Opinions, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/opinion/judges-should-write-their-own-opinions.html 
(arguing for the importance of the written, published judicial opinions in U.S. jurisprudence). 
 319. See Parrish, supra note 312, at 674–75. 
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6. The Effects of Globalization. 
Presumably, if judges are commanded by statute not to look at foreign law in 
the state law cases before them, most responsible judges will attempt in good 
faith to abide by the command, rather than try to evade it.320  But as time goes 
on the pressures on courts to find ways of incorporating foreign legal matters 
into their judicial decisions will inevitably increase.321  The reason is the rapidly 
accelerating pace of legal globalization.322 
Consider Oklahoma, the state where the AFIL movement began.323  There 
may have been a time in the not too distant past when states such as Oklahoma 
were sufficiently commercially and socially isolated so that foreign law had 
minimal impact on the legal lives of their citizens.  The beginning of this article 
quoted some famous lyrics from the Broadway musical, Oklahoma!, which was 
set at about the time of Oklahoma’s statehood in 1907.324  One of the songs in 
the musical whimsically treated nearby Kansas City, Missouri as far-away and 
culturally foreign to the denizens of the soon-to-be Sooner state, 325
 
though 
intriguingly for the present discussion the musical also featured energetic local 
commercial enterprise by a Middle Eastern immigrant.326  Perhaps Oklahoma 
was pretty isolated back then.  But today, with the global networks of 
communication, transportation, and trade that are presently enjoyed, even a 
landlocked heartland state, such as Oklahoma, is rife with international and 
foreign contacts.327   With global contact comes global legal interaction and 
cross-fertilization.328  With interaction and cross-fertilization come transnational 
legal disputes.329 
On the commercial side, even modest local businesses in Oklahoma are likely 
in the twenty-first
 
century to have foreign partners, investors, suppliers, 
                                                             
 320. See id. at 664–65. 
 321. See id. at 679–80. 
 322. See Leonard Bierman & Michael A. Hitt, The Globalization of Legal Practice in the 
Internet Age, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 29, 34 (2007); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, National 
Jurisdiction and Global Business Networks, Earl A. Snyder Lecture in International Law, 17 IND. 
J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 165, 166 (2010); Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World is Flat: Globalization and 
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(2008); William D. Henderson, The Globalization of the Legal Profession, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL 
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STUD. L. REV. 463, 484 (2005). 
 323. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1. 
 324. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN & RICHARD RODGERS, 
Oklahoma! (1943). 
 325. Oscar Hammerstein & Richard Roger, Oklahoma! 8–9, Act 1, Scene 1 (1943). 
 326. Id. at “Cast of Characters.” 
 327. E.g., Wilson, supra note 218, at 887. 
 328. See id. at 888. 
 329. Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 37, 38 (1993). 
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customers, competitors, and employees.330  These businesses are likely to enter 
into contracts with foreign entities, buy or sell property or services with foreign 
entities, advertise in foreign markets, ship goods to foreign destinations, import 
goods from foreign sources, engage in business activities that subject them to 
foreign regulations and legal duties, pay foreign taxes, communicate throughout 
the world, and otherwise engage in global business activities.331 
On the social side, the state is likely to have citizens who travel extensively to 
foreign destinations, enter into various domestic legal relations abroad, buy or 
sell or own or dispose of foreign property, have foreign tax and other legal 
obligations, engage in transnational consumer transactions, commit foreign 
crimes, and communicate internationally. 332   There will also be numerous 
foreign individuals who come to Oklahoma as tourists, on visas for various 
business purposes, as students at universities in Oklahoma, and as legal residents 
living and working in Oklahoma.333  Other people will “enter” the state virtually 
through various internet communications and transactions.334 
These kinds of foreign interactions have no doubt increased exponentially 
over the past two or three decades.  These interactions will increase even more 
rapidly in the next several decades.  Unlike its portrayal in the musical, modern 
Oklahoma is not simply about cowboys and farmers anymore, although today 
even cowboys and farmers have extensive webs of global contact.335 
In the face of such rampant global activity, legal disputes that contain one or 
more components of foreign or international law are sure to occur, to increase in 
number and potential complexity, and to do so rapidly.336  When they do, the 
                                                             
 330. E.g., Buxbaum, supra note 322, at 165–66. 
 331. Indeed, the University of Oklahoma’s business school, Price College of Business, pays 
particular attention to the area of international business. See About Price, THE UNIV. OF OKLA.: 
PRICE C. OF BUS., http://www.ou.edu/content/price/about_price.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).  
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 332. E.g., Bierman & Hitt, supra note 322, at 30; Passports, OKLA. CTY., 
http://www.oklahomacounty.org/courtclerk/PassportOffice.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
 333. A 2010 survey identified 5.5% of the Oklahoman population (roughly 206,000 people) as 
foreign born.  Selected Characteristics of the Foreign-Born Population by Period of Entry into the 
United States: 2010 American Community Survey 1–Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
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Enrollment Increases in Oklahoma, Nationwide, NEWS OK (Nov. 13, 2012), http://newsok.com/ 
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Additionally, as of 2012, Oklahoma ranked 25th in the nation in terms of the number of international 
university students.  Id. 
 334. E.g., Bierman & Hitt, supra note 322, at 30. 
 335. As evidence of this, even small cattle farmer publications now include news on 
international affairs.  See On the Global Ag Front, THE CATTLE BUS. WKLY (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.cattlebusinessweekly.com/Content/Headlines/-Headlines/Article/On-the-Global-Ag-
Front/1/1/6061. 
 336. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 329, at 38. 
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people and businesses of the state, or foreign individuals working and living in 
the state, will naturally seek recourse to the state’s courts for adjudication of at 
least some of these legal disputes.337  If the state courts are prohibited from 
considering relevant foreign and international law, local litigants will find 
themselves at a significant disadvantage. 338   They will be forced either to 
navigate around the limits on the local courts’ capacity to take foreign law into 
account, or to go elsewhere to litigate their foreign-law-containing disputes.339  
Either option is likely to be costly and cumbersome to the litigants, particularly 
the ones who are denizens of Oklahoma.340  Either option will also undermine 
the power and capacity of the state court system to serve the community’s legal 
interests and needs.341 
Collectively, these pernicious consequences of the AFIL statutes significantly 
outweigh their supposed anticipatory, prophylactic benefits.  Even where 
wholesale exceptionalism is constitutional, it is unwise and should be rejected as 
an unnecessary and potentially harmful interference with state judicial power. 
III. SELECTIVE EXCEPTIONALISM 
Although wholesale U.S. legal exceptionalism of the type embodied in the 
current round of AFIL statutes and proposals is misguided, the concept of U.S. 
legal exceptionalism should not be dismissed in its entirety.  To the contrary, 
U.S. law and the U.S. legal experience are indeed exceptional in many important 
respects.  There are important places in U.S. law where one should be able to 
rely at least partly on exceptionalist reasoning as a basis for deliberate 
differentiation between U.S. legal principles and those of other nations with 
which we share common legal ground. 
Ironically, one prominent example is the matter of separation between church 
and state, the very issue on which Oklahoma’s AFIL provision foundered.342  
                                                             
 337. See Davis, supra note 54, at 651. 
 338. Id. at 643–44. 
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 342. See, e.g., Dr. Sophie C. van Bijsterveld, Church and State in Western Europe and the 
United States: Principles and Perspectives, 2000 BYU L. REV. 989, at 993–94 (2000) (observing 
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Understood as the principle of the separation of church and state, laïcité operates in the 
United States in an infinitely harder and more rigid manner than in France. The American 
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Although many world constitutional orders purport to protect religious 
freedom,343  few, if any, include the kind of strong restrictions on the legal 
relations between government and religion that have developed in U.S. 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  The long United States historical and 
social experience of wide diversity in faith, coupled with legal traditions and 





Century wars of religion, plus the United States’ firm commitment 
to individual freedom of thought and belief, collectively have produced an 
historically strong strain of commitment to secular government in the United 
States.344  That tradition began before nationhood, is embodied in the language 
of the Constitution,345 is reflected in every state constitution,346 and has been 
developed and applied through two centuries of energetic constitutional 
jurisprudence.347  Efforts to soften those commitments based on foreign law 
ought to be opposed, even though other constitutional democracies which share 
our general commitment to religious freedom often tolerate far more intersection 
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stateconstitutions/index.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (providing a complete database of the 
religious freedom clauses of every state constitution). 
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[T]he rationales for religious toleration that emerged from sixteenth and seventeenth 
century England and Europe . . . formed the historical context and theoretical foundation 
for the American achievement of religious freedom. That achievement is the offspring of 
the bitter struggle against persecution and the fierce intellectual controversies that arose 
out of the divisions created by the Protestant Reformation. 
Id. 
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between church and state than U.S. legal principles typically permit.348  While 
the consideration of other nations’ religious freedom precedent and legal 
practice should not be banned, much of it is likely to be inapplicable to U.S. law 
as a consequence of the unique character of U.S. church-state relations. 
If wholesale exceptionalism is unwise, but it is still sometimes appropriate to 
claim that exceptional characteristics set our laws apart, it follows that a 
principled basis is necessary for exercising subject-specific exceptionalist 
limitations on resort to foreign law.  To establish such a principled framework, 
objective criteria for selective exceptionalism need to be developed.  Where and 
how is it right and proper for U.S. exceptionalism to be invoked as a principle 
barring use of foreign law?  Where and when should exceptionalist claims be 
contested?  And how is a system of selective exceptionalism to be squared with 
a constitutional commitment to the rule of law? 
These issues are not unique to the United States.  Most nations with durable 
and stable constitutional democratic governments can make their own 
exceptionalist claims.349  Consider, for example, the constitutional democracies 
around the world that share elements of the U.K. common law tradition.350  
Besides the United Kingdom, they include the United States, Canada, Australia, 
India, Ireland, and South Africa.351  Thanks to their common legal heritage, these 
nations share many common legal structures and adhere to many common legal 
principles, both constitutionally and in terms of their public and private law.352  
They are among the nations whose laws U.S. courts would be most likely to find 
practically useful and needed resources. 353   Yet the social, cultural, 
demographic, geographical, religious, and political histories of these nations are 
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vitally different.354   In each instance, those differences have contributed to 
specific differences in law that set each nation apart from the others in legally 
important ways.355  While the courts of many of these nations seem less troubled 
than the U.S. Supreme Court about the propriety of consulting outside legal 
sources, 356  they still must decide whether, when, where, and how to set 
appropriate limits on the use and influence of foreign or international judgments, 
in the name of preserving essential elements of domestic law that are grounded 
on exceptional national experience.357 
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relevance of foreign precedent.  For this reason, they are a potential source for developing principles 
guiding selective exceptionalism.  See Truth About Motorways Pty. Ltd. v. Macquarie 
Infrastructure Inv. Mgmt. Ltd. (2000) HCA 11, para. 32-33 (Austl.) (looking to U.S. Supreme Court 
cases to resolve a question of standing under the Australian Constitution); Austl. Conservation 
Found. v. The Commonwealth (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493, para. 20 (Austl.) (discussing and analyzing 
major U.S. Supreme Court cases on standing); Amalgamated Soc’y of Eng’rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co. 
Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 146-48 (Austl.) (noting that the differences between the foundations and 
history of Australia and the United States make reliance on U.S. federalism cases futile); State v. 
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 56 (S. Afr.). 
The United States jurisprudence has not resolved the dilemma arising from the fact that 
the Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, but . . . contemplates that there 
will be capital punishment . . . The difficulties that have been experienced in following 
this path . . . persuade me that we should not follow this route. 
Id.; HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2009] para. 27-29 (Isr.) 
(holding, after examining the steps taken by the Israeli Defense Forces during a large-scale military 
operation in the Gaza Strip, that the IDF had complied with international law); R. v. Hape, [2007] 
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This Article does not pretend to offer a thoroughly worked out set of answers 
to these questions.  What it does present are some working hypotheses that are 
intended to suggest the direction that development of a mature theory of 
selective exceptionalism ought to take. 
A. The Contrast between Wholesale and Selective Exceptionalism 
The chief flaw in the current round of AFIL statutes and proposals is the 
attempt many of them make to block all, or nearly all, access to foreign or 
international law within the legal domain of state adjudication, without regard to 
degrees of potential relevance.  But rejection of such wholesale exceptionalism 
does not require rejection of a more selective approach.  Legal exception is not 
always justified, but it is appropriate in some, perhaps even many, cases.  Instead 
of a broad proscription on consideration of any foreign or international law, what 
is needed is a process to determine on an issue-by-issue level what foreign and 
international law is relevant, and what is not. 
Indeed, wholesale and selective exceptionalism are based on diametrically 
different perspectives toward foreign and international law.358  By categorically 
denying the relevance of all foreign and international material from particular 
jurisdictions, the wholesale approach actively precludes any consideration of 
foreign sources.359  In contrast, the selective version actively invites and even 
potentially necessitates consideration of foreign and international law.  This 
difference in perspective arises because under a selective approach, it is not 
possible to decide whether or not foreign or international legal sources are 
relevant without first determining what it is they say, whether what they say 
bears on the issues in the legal proceeding or dispute, and if so in what ways.360  
                                                             
2 S.C.R. 292, 313–16 (Can.) (reaffirming that rules of international law have force of law in 
Canada). 
 358. See supra text accompanying notes 1-70.. 
 359. Id. 
 360. A selective approach is visible in many foreign judicial systems.  See, e.g., HCJ 7957/04 
Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Isr., 106(2) PD 201, 20-21 [2005] (Isr.) (stating, in a decision 
considering the legitimacy of the separation wall between Israel and the West Bank: 
[W]e need not, in the framework of the petition before us, take a position regarding the 
force of the international conventions on human rights in the area. Nor shall we examine 
the interrelationship between international humanitarian law and international law on 
human rights . . . However, we shall assume – without deciding the matter – that the 
international conventions on human rights apply in the area. 
Id.; Al Kateb v. Goodwin, (2004) HCA 37, para. 62–70 (Austl.) (featuring debate about role of 
international law in Australian constitutional interpretation); Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (5) S.A. 
401 (CC), at para. 35–40 (S. Afr.) (exploring conflicts between defamation cases in Canada, 
Germany, Australia, and the United States to analyze whether an action for defamation requires a 
showing that the statement was false); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) S.A. 391 (CC) para. 38, 40, 
60, 151 (S. Afr.) (declaring the death penalty unconstitutional in South Africa after considering the 
laws of numerous nations in its rationale); State v. Williams, 1995 (3) S.A. 362 (CC) para. 32–33, 
96 (S. Afr.) (holding that juvenile whipping has been characterized throughout the world as a 
degrading and violent form of punishment and therefore abolishing the practice to fall in line with 
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Consequently, while wholesale exceptionalism promotes denial of foreign and 
international sources, selective exceptionalism promotes interaction.361 
In order to decide selectively whether foreign or international law is relevant 
to a legal question, one must first consider what the foreign law is, how it relates 
to domestic law, how it relates to the facts and issues in the case, and whether 
there are grounds for either bringing foreign and domestic law together or 
keeping them apart.  One must, in other words, actively engage with foreign or 
international law, taking it into account before deciding whether or not it has a 
bearing on the domestic legal question.362  In contrast, categorical across-the-
board rejection of an entire body of foreign or international law prohibits even 
preliminary assessment of its relevance. 363   In other words, wholesale 
exceptionalism denies the applicability of outside legal sources ex ante, while 
selective exceptionalism, when it does deny the relevance of outside sources, 
does so only ex post.364 
The wholesale and ex ante character of categorical exceptionalism makes it 
subject to special dangers that are less salient in the selective model.  Wholesale 
exceptionalism risks collapse into either nativist insularity or legal nationalism, 
or both. 365   These dangers arise in part because a claim of national 
                                                             
international consensus).  See generally James Allan, Grant Huscroft & Nessa Lynch, The Citation 
of Overseas Authority in Rights Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11 
OTAGO L. REV. 433, 434, 437–38 (2007); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The 
Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1188, 1208–09 
(2001); Lyonette Louis-Jacques, New Rights-New Laws: Legal Information In A Changing World 
Wide Web, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 474, 474–75 (2004). 
 361. See supra text accompanying notes 1-70. 
 362. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 128 (2005) [hereinafter Jackson, Constitutional 
Comparisons] (advocating an “engagement” model of comparative constitutional law which 
consists of “issue-by-issue analysis and does not necessarily mean adoption, but thoughtful, well-
informed consideration” of foreign law); Koh, International Law, supra note 229, at 53 (urging the 
development of a “transnationalist jurisprudence,” which includes “understanding and making 
reference to foreign constitutional precedents” as an aid to constitutional interpretation); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 195 (2003) (arguing 
that international dialogue proceeds through “increasingly direct interactions[,]” which “both 
contribute to a nascent global jurisprudence on particular issues and improve the quality of 
particular national decisions, sometimes by importing ideas and sometimes by insisting on an 
idiosyncratic national approach for specific cultural, historical, or political reasons”); Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999) 
(suggesting that “U.S. courts can sometimes gain insights into the appropriate interpretation of the 
U.S. Constitution by a cautious and careful analysis of constitutional experience elsewhere.”). 
 363. See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra Section III.A. through infra note 369. 
 365. See Andrew Kohut & Bruce Stokes, supra note 259 (exploring the link between American 
exceptionalist attitudes and U.S. nationalism, as well as the negative effects these attitudes can have 
on an international level); Minxin Pei, The Paradoxes of American Nationalism, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/02/the-paradoxes-of-american-nationalism/ 
(broadly discussing the backlash against American nationalism); Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold 
Rush-Part I: Hamdi, 9/11 and the Dark Side of American Enlightenment, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
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exceptionalism is so easily invoked.366  Every nation has a unique political and 
cultural history.367  Thus, any nation, at any juncture, can assert unique historical 
and political experiences that allegedly distinguish it from the rest of the 
world.368  Exclusively stressing these differences tends to reinforce domestic 
nationalist strains of thought.369  Claims that “we’re different” or “our law is 
different” all too easily metamorphose into claims that “we’re better” or “our 
law is better,” which in turn reinforce nativist identity politics and a nationalist 
political agenda.370  The stress of difference also tends to promote isolation—a 
“do-it-ourselves” attitude about the law.371  In the United States, this strain 
correlates with a national conviction of the virtues of rugged and self-reliant 
independence that is also deeply woven into the fabric of our national 
narrative.372 
Yet to stress only national differences, without recognizing potential 
similarities with other nations, is to do justice to only one part of one’s national 
story.  Just as there are differences with other nations that find their expression 
in law, there are also significant commonalities, shared legal commitments, and 
shared legal traditions. 
Consider, for example, the United States and Australia. 373   Both are 
constitutional democracies.374  Both follow a federal constitutional structure.375  
                                                             
341, 345–46 n.14 (2007) (arguing that exceptionalist attitudes have led to fevered American 
nationalism in the form of military aggression and disregard for the human rights of enemy 
combatants). 
 366. See, e.g., Kohut & Stokes, supra note 259. 
 367. See generally The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, supra note 351. 
 368. See supra note 356. 
 369. See, e.g., Pei, supra note 365. 
 370. See supra note 365. 
 371. See Kohut & Stokes, supra note 259. 
 372. The first use of the term “rugged individualism” has been attributed to President Herbert 
Hoover in a 1928 presidential campaign speech and refers to a belief that individuals can succeed 
with minimal governmental aid.  Herbert Hoover, Presidential Campaign Speech (Oct. 22, 1928) 
(transcript available at http://www.pinzler.com/ushistory/ruggedsupp.html); see also Roger 
Rosenblatt, Essay: The Rugged Individual Rides Again, TIME (Oct. 15, 1984), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,923739-1,00.html (“Everyone always says that 
rugged individualism is the backbone, and the jawbone, of America; that a country as grand and 
sturdy as this could only have been built by the self-propelled and self-interested strivings of wild-
eyed nonconformists, each fur-laden Daniel Boone pursuing his independent errand into the 
wilderness.”); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical 
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 377 (2002) (“Unionization, of course, is a 
matter of collective action. The dominant American self-image, in contrast, is squarely grounded in 
the cult of the individual.”). 
 373. See generally Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
13 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 37, 41–43 (2006) (providing a broad comparison and contrast of the 
American and Australian common law systems). 
 374. See The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, supra note 351; see also Saunders, 
supra note 373, at 44–45. 
 375. See Saunders, supra note 373, at 44–45. 
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Both share the U.K. common law tradition, producing substantial commonality 
in such areas of law as torts, contracts, and property, as well as judicial 
process.376  The two nations make similar commitments to the rights of the 
accused, and their civil and criminal courts function in procedurally similar 
ways. 377   They share many national and international human rights 
commitments.378  Yet there are also key differences.379  Australia is part of the 
British Commonwealth and recognizes the British Monarchy.380  Its national 
constitution lacks a bill of rights.381  It follows a parliamentary governmental 
structure. 382   Its courts are much more aggressive about incorporating 
international law principles into domestic adjudication.383  Both nations have 
struggled with race relations, but in different social and historical contexts.384  
The United States has struggled with the profound social and legal issues 
surrounding enslavement and racial segregation, while in Australia problems of 
race have been deeply intertwined with issues of aboriginal rights and culture.385  
These are just a few of the many important legal differences between the two 
nations.  Doubtless, those differences are reflected in important ways in their 
respective laws.  But so are the similarities. 
In comparable fashion, insisting on isolated self-sufficiency denies the 
emerging realities of a global economy and society that are rapidly breaking 
down national barriers, producing substantially increased legal interaction and 
legal convergence, especially in areas of corporate and commercial law. 386  
                                                             
 376. See The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, supra note 351. 
 377. E.g., Saunders, supra note 373, at 44–45. 
 378. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 379. See Saunders, supra note 373, at 44-45. 
 380. Queen and Australia, THE BRITISH MONARCHY, http://www.royal.gov.uk/monarch 
andcommonwealth/australia/australia.aspx. 
 381. Saunders, supra note 373, at 44. 
 382. E.g., id. at 45. 
 383. See Saunders, supra note 373, at 41–42 (arguing that Australia’s common law courts more 
openly observe comparative law than U.S. courts); Nicholas Aroney, Comparative Law in 
Australian Constitutional Jurisprudence, 26 U. OF QUEENSL. L.J. 317, 319 (2007) (finding that the 
High Court of Australia is more open to looking to comparative law in its constitutional rulings than 
the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 384. Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand”: A Century of Racial Segregation, 1849-
1950, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-segregation.html 
(hereinafter “Brown v. Board at Fifty”); David Hollinsworth, Racism and Indigenous People in 
Australia, 12 GLOBAL DIALOGUE (2010), http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=484. 
 385. Brown v. Board at Fifty, supra note 384; Hollinsworth, supra note 384. 
 386. See Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, The Paradox of Legal Harmonization, 132 
PUB. CHOICE 367, 368–69 (2007) (discussing the various manners in which nations can harmonize 
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Wholesale ex ante exceptionalism exaggerates the differences without 
adequately valuing the similarities, intersections, and convergences. 387   By 
doing so, it artificially distorts the collective national legal narrative.388  It does 
so, moreover, in ways that press toward legal isolation from the rest of the world, 
or support an impulse to dominate it by imposing domestic legal rules on all 
actors and transactions.389  As worldwide political and military lessons from the 
last century demonstrate, if carried to extremes either tendency risks profound 
negative consequences.390 
Wholesale exceptionalism also fails to account for the increasingly wide turf 
of legal common ground that most modern constitutional democracies share,391 
as well as the breadth of legal internationalization that has occurred in U.S. 
domestic law as a necessary consequence of economic globalization.392  As a 
functional matter, due to globalization of business and economic behavior, it is 
                                                             
their laws with other nations in order to better accommodate international commerce); Claudio 
Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered 
Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 9–10 (1993). 
Such recent developments as . . . the increasing integration of national economies into a 
global economy have dramatically increased the pressure on international law to respond 
to the expansion of international legal issues and actors.  These developments challenge 
international law to either adapt its key principles, such as sovereignty, to these new 
realities, or to develop new principles that more adequately reflect the world in which 
international law must operate. 
Id. 
 387. See, e.g., MICHAEL BURLEIGH, THE THIRD REICH: A NEW HISTORY 12 (Hill & Wang 
2000). 
 388. E.g., id. 
 389. E.g., id. 
 390. See, e.g., id. (discussing the role of isolationism and nationalism in contributing to WWI 
and WWII, specifically in Germany). 
 391. See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 39 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998) (noting the basic rule of comparativism is that 
“different legal systems give the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same 
problems of life, despite the great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, 
and style of operation”); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and 
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254 (2001) (“A number of 
constitutional systems around the world now have judicially enforceable protections of freedom of 
expression, equality of treatment, human liberty, and freedom from inhumane punishments.”). 
 392. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Declaration, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (providing basic protections for 
intellectual property in an international context); Convention on Nuclear Safety, June 17, 1994, 
1963 U.N.T.S. 293, 317; Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (committing to the reduction of greenhouse 
gases); North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057 
(creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America); Marrakesh Declaration: Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (regulating the rules of 
international trade); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 59. 
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increasingly difficult to discern where international or foreign law ends and 
domestic law begins. 
For example, imagine a legal dispute in Oklahoma over a contract between a 
U.S. firm and an Australian firm that contains a choice of law clause electing 
Australian contract law.  Are the interpretation and enforcement of that clause 
by a U.S. court expressions of the U.S. legal principle favoring contractual 
choice of law,393 or do they involve the sort of resort to foreign law that an AFIL 
statute renders impermissible?  Does the answer depend on whether the 
Australian law in question has a similar content to U.S. law because it derives 
from a similar common law source?  What about a contract that refers to 
industrial or labor standards set by an international body, or that contains 
promises to adhere to the requirements of an international environmental treaty?  
Can local courts interpret and enforce these contract provisions?  What about a 
tort action between an Oklahoma resident and an Australian party in which, 
because of the location of the tort, Oklahoma choice of law principles would 
ordinarily lead to the application of Australian tort law?  Is following such a 
choice of law rule forbidden?  Courts in states with AFIL statutes will face the 
unenviable task of finding answers to such perplexing questions.394  Depending 
on what those answers are, moreover, business entities and potential litigants 
may find it prudent to find ways of avoiding, prohibiting, or circumventing 
access to those courts.  One possible result could be the diminution of 
transnational business and commerce in Oklahoma, to the economic detriment 
of the people in that state. 
While the challenge of drawing the line between domestic and foreign or 
international law may be less severe in the constitutional realm, blocking access 
to foreign sources partly misapprehends the character of constitutional 
inquiry. 395   The challenge of constitutional interpretation often involves 
determining how a generally shared and fairly uniformly articulated 
constitutional norm, such as equality, freedom of expression, or fair process, 
should apply to an emergent and previously unfamiliar or unexamined 
situation.396  Where the underlying constitutional norm is shared and has been 
                                                             
 393. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1971). 
 394. E.g., Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 235.  A related issue is whether U.S. federal 
courts, hearing cases under federal diversity jurisdiction, must also refrain from any reliance on 
foreign law in cases to which the law of Oklahoma applies.  Although an Oklahoma AFIL statute 
clearly would not bind federal courts directly, the federal courts’ obligation to conform the 
substantive rules of decision under federal diversity jurisdiction to those of applicable state law 
might require a federal court to observe the state’s dictates regarding foreign law when sitting in 
diversity. 
 395. See generally Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and 
Strategy of Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 301, 303–04 (2004); 
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 820–21 (1999). 
 396. See generally Annus, supra note 395, at 303–04; Choudhry, supra note 395, at 820–21. 
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articulated in different legal systems through comparable legal standards, 
differences in national experience that concern the formation or adoption of the 
norm are relatively unlikely to produce national differences in interpretation.397  
The nations that share commitment to the norm all came to the same juncture, 
even if by different roads.398 
Rather, legal differences between nations are more likely to stem from 
differences in the relative intensity of national commitment to the shared norm, 
or from differences in contemporary social or cultural context that affect the 
expression of the norm in action.399  The relevance of exceptionalism depends 
on its capacity to illuminate these differences in the contemporary political, 
legal, or cultural settings that distinguish one national experience from another 
and thus affect the operative scope or application of the shared principle in a 
particular context.400  Where such differences can be demonstrated, an appeal to 
exceptionalism is available to support an alternative legal outcome. 401   But 
where the norms are common, the intensity of commitment to them is roughly 
the same, and the factual and cultural circumstances in which the issues arise 
are not demonstrably different in ways that matter, a foreign resolution of the 
issue ought to be relevant as a potential guide for analysis of the common legal 
problem.402 
The relevance of the foreign principle, however, does not equate with its 
actual application.403  When a domestic U.S. court considers a foreign principle 
or decision, finds it relevant, determines that it is at least partly persuasive, and 
incorporates that insight into the resolution of the legal dispute before it, the 
result is not an application of foreign law, or the delegation of the outcome to a 
                                                             
 397. See generally Annus, supra note 395, at 303–04; Choudhry, supra note 395, at 820–21. 
 398. See generally Annus, supra note 395; Choudhry, supra note 395 (both providing 
discussions on international legal norms creation). 
 399. See generally Annus, supra note 395, at 348 (“Interpreting broad constitutional principles 
or balancing constitutional values needs to take into account the particular cultural and social setting 
of the court more than uncertain notions of ‘international consensus.’”); Choudhry, supra note 395, 
at 825–26 (1999) (asserting that there are three kinds of comparative constitutional interpretation: 
universalist, which is premised on the assumption that constitutional principles arise from shared 
universal norms; dialogical, which focuses on assumptions underlying constitutional jurisprudence 
when determining whether or not to adopt the reasoning of foreign courts; and genealogical, which 
is concerned with similarities in the historical backgrounds of constitutions). 
 400. See Annus, supra note 395, at 348–49. 
 401. See, e.g., id. 
 402. Examples of this sort of selective process abound in foreign courts.  See, e.g., Joy v. Fed. 
Territory Islamic Religious Council, [2007] 1 L.R.C. 1, 1–2 (Malaysia); Republic v. Fast Track 
High Court, Accra, ex parte Comm’n on Human Rts. & Admin. Justice, [2009] 1 L.R.C. 44, 45 
(Ghana) (citing a variety of international legal precedents in a case determining the jurisdiction of 
the High Court of Ghana, including nine citations from the UK, two from South Africa, two from 
Canada, and one from the US); see also Kirby, supra note 356, at 435–36 (noting the wealth of 
reference to the law of other nations in cases from national courts engaged in comparative legal 
analysis). 
 403. See, e.g., Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 228–29. 
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foreign legal system.404  To the contrary, it is the U.S. court that makes the 
decision, and it implements it as a matter of domestic U.S. law.405  Foreign law 
may have played a role in the decisional process, but the control of that process 
rested at all times with the domestic U.S. court, which exercised its own legal 
discretion and judgment in deciding how to resolve the matter in question.406 
This is particularly true in situations where nations have joined in common 
commitments to international treaties or conventions that embody a particular 
set of legal principles.  In those circumstances, typically the popularly elected 
democratic arms of domestic government have formally acknowledged common 
legal ground with other nations on the matters that are the subject of the 
convention or treaty, and have committed their domestic governments to 
adherence to the common principles.407  By doing so, they have given formal 
domestic legal recognition to the foundations for comparative inquiry.408  What 
those principles mean in the law of one adhering nation-state should, therefore, 
have relevance for the understanding of what they mean in another.409 
For these reasons, among others, the objections to wholesale exceptionalism 
do not apply to a selective approach.410  Wholesale exceptionalism is neither 
desirable nor particularly workable, and it risks certain pernicious 
consequences.411  By setting a conclusive presumption against the use of foreign 
or international law, it goes way too far.  In contrast, selective exceptionalism, 
through its active engagement with foreign and international sources, provides a 
cogent and reasoned means for discerning the circumstances in which foreign 
and international law are appropriately relevant, as well as the circumstances in 
which they are not.412 
B. Standards for Selective Exceptionalism 
If selective exceptionalism is to comport with the rule of law, we need at least 
a provisional set of relatively identifiable, objective, and consistently applicable 
guidelines for determining when it is appropriately invoked.  While it may not 
be possible to offer a comprehensive set of criteria, there are at least four 
potential sources from which it is possible to generate appropriate guidelines for 
                                                             
 404. See id. 
 405. See, e.g., Rahdert supra note 44, at 606–07; Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 228–
29 (elaborating on the distinction between looking to foreign law in a decision and applying that 
foreign law over American law). 
 406. See Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 228–29. 
 407. See supra note 392. 
 408. See id. 
 409. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle 
for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 430 (2001) (suggesting that the 
changing nature of international intellectual property litigation “may herald a greater role for 
comparative thought than intellectual property litigation would heretofore have provided”). 
 410. See supra notes 365–72 and accompanying text. 
 411. See, e.g., id. 
 412. See, e.g., id. 
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selective exception: legal text, governmental structure, political institutions, and 
legal tradition. 
1. Legal Text 
The most immediate and obvious guide to selective exceptionalism is 
constitutional or statutory text.  Where a domestic constitutional or statutory text 
specifically declares its exceptional character, or where by its terms it differs in 
some substantial and legally significant way from other constitutional or 
statutory texts elsewhere on a commonly shared legal issue, that textual 
difference is a potentially potent signal of an exceptionalist position.413  This is 
particularly true if the text directly refers to some specific ground of exceptional 
national experience, or if its historical milieu shows that its peculiarities of 
language respond directly to such a national experience.414  Courts that openly 
engage in comparative legal analysis typically exercise great care in exploring 
textual differences in constitutional or statutory language and often rely on those 
differences as a basis for distinguishing differences in legal interpretation.415  
Particularly where those differences can be tied to deliberate constitutional or 
legislative choices to diverge from an established international pattern, textual 
variation of this sort can be a powerful indicator of exceptionalism. 
An example in the U.S. system might well be the Second Amendment.416  In 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 417  each of the two principal competing 
interpretations of the Second Amendment treated it as deeply rooted in the U.S. 
historical experience.418  The majority read the language of the Amendment’s 
operative clause as triggering a distinct historically rooted U.S. right to possess 
and carry (“keep and bear”) arms for purposes of self-defense and defense of 
one’s property.419  The principal dissent read the language of the Amendment’s 
prefatory clause (“well-regulated militia”) as referring to the unique U.S. 
practice, during the early Republic, of allowing individuals to maintain arms for 
purposes of military service.420  In both views, the language of the Amendment 
drew upon U.S. practices and customs regarding personal use of arms that 
arguably distinguished U.S. constitutional law on the question from the legal 
rules and practices of other nations.421 
                                                             
 413. Cf. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) at para. 36. 
 414. Cf. id. 
 415. See id. (examining linguistic differences in foreign constitutional laws to determine 
potential relevance to constitutionality of death penalty in South Africa). 
 416. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 417. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 418. Compare id. at 595 (majority opinion), with id. at 651–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 419. Id. at 595 (majority opinion) (concluding “on the basis of both text and history, that the 
Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms”). 
 420. Id. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[w]hen each word in the text is given 
full effect, the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess 
arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia”). 
 421. See id. at 593, 637. 
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In this regard, the process used in Oklahoma and elsewhere to express the 
state’s exceptionalist sentiments cannot be faulted.  The best and most effective 
way to establish an exceptionalist posture is to signal it directly in the language 
of the relevant legal text, which is precisely what Oklahoma and other AFIL 
states have done.  The problem with these measures, aside from attempted 
religious exceptionalism, is the categorical character of foreign law preclusion, 
not the fact that they use explicit language to establish an exceptionalist norm.  
If a political community wants to set itself apart on a matter of law, it is best to 
be overt about it.  The clearer the textual difference, the better the case is for 
conscious legal differentiation in an exceptional direction. 
Indeed, the capacity for explicit differentiation through constitutional or 
statutory text is a strong antidote to the argument that any resort to foreign or 
international law creates a “democratic deficit.”422  The gist of that argument is 
that reliance on foreign law surrenders decisional authority to the foreign or 
international source, which is not accountable to the people through democratic 
processes.423  As long as judicial determinations that rely on foreign law are 
subject to explicit textual correction through a democratic legislative or 
constitutional process, there is no greater deficit in the case of using foreign or 
international law than there is in any other kind of judicial decision.424 
                                                             
 422. See Kirby, supra note 356, at 454–55. 
There remains, however, the democratic deficit.  This is an objection common to the 
hesitation of U.S. and Australian jurists when analogies to the resolution of a municipal 
law problem are propounded with reference to the principles of foreign or international 
law as expressed in courts, tribunals, and other bodies outside the judicature of the nation-
state. 
Id. 
 423. See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1225 (2007). 
Federal laws, whether they regulate citizens and states, or constrain the power that our 
own executive actors would otherwise enjoy, go through an arduous process of 
bicameralism and presentment that offers some guarantee of democratic control.  By 
contrast, international law has a severe democracy deficit.  The more sweeping the claim 
of authority for international law, the more pronounced the democracy deficit and the 
more dubious the assertion that customary international law should override domestic 
law. 
Id. 
 424. See Harold Hongju Koh, A Community of Reason and Rights, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 583, 
591 (2008). 
[T]he argument goes, if judges place their fundamental values into the Constitution 
through judicial interpretation, they effectively override the will of elected officials.  But 
there is a democratic deficit that judges face whether they are citing to international and 
foreign law or whether they are just interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution to say that equal treatment does not mean separate but equal. 
Id. 
598 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:537 
2. Legal Structure 
A second, more diffuse and hence more contestable, guide for selective 
exceptionalism is legal structure.  Any comparative law survey discloses areas 
of both similarity and substantial difference in governmental structure among 
different national governing systems.425  For example, there are many federalist 
constitutional systems around the world, but examination reveals a fairly wide 
range of structural differences in the construction of nation-state or nation-
province relations. 426   Typically, those differences grow out of important 
differences in culture and history that affect both the way nation and state 
authorities are defined and how they functionally interact.427  Thus, for example, 
U.S. federalism reflects the historical fact that the 13 original states had separate 
existence and possessed distinct sovereign identity before national union under 
first the Articles of Confederation, and then the U.S. Constitution, occurred; 
while Canadian federalism reflects, among other things, the distinct legal and 
cultural traditions of its Anglophone and Francophone provinces.428  Although 
one should not entirely rule out the possibility of shared ground over the 
structure and function of federalism, legal decisions that are grounded in 
federalism should leave considerable room for national divergence that reflects 
the peculiarities of a particular society’s view of the appropriate vertical 
distribution of governmental powers.429 
3. Political Institutions 
A third possible source for selective exception is the identification of unique 
political institutions that perform distinctive governmental functions within a 
particular governmental system.  Where a nation’s legal system includes an 
institution that other governments do not share, the operation of that institution 
will necessarily take on an exceptional character.  An example in the United 
                                                             
 425. See Lee Peoples, Comparative Law Methodology and Sources, OKLA. CITY UNIV. LAW 
LIBR. (2005), www2.okcu.edu/law/lawlib/pdfs/guide_comparative.pdf (listing the several types of 
comparative studies employed). 
 426. See generally Craig Volden, Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of 
William H. Riker, 34 PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM, 89, 90–91 (2004); Daniel J. Elazar, Contrasting 
Unity and Federal Systems, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 237, 238-39 (1997). 
 427. See Volden, supra note 426, at 91–95 (describing the different ways that federalist 
systems originate). 
 428. Ellis Katz, American Federalism, Past, Present and Future, U.S. INFORMATION 
SERVICE’S ELECTRONIC J. (April 1997), http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~ras2777/amgov/ 
federalism.html; Jay Makarenko, Federalism in Canada: Basic Framework and Operation, 
MAPLELEAFWEB (Jan. 11, 2008), http://mapleleafweb.com/features/federalism-canada-basic-
framework-and-operation. 
 429. The tendency of federalist structures to reflect unique historical and cultural patterns may 
lie behind the Supreme Court’s refusal, in Printz v. United States, to countenance the comparative 
arguments made by Justice Breyer in his dissent regarding patterns of vertical law enforcement 
integration followed in other federal systems.  521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11, 976–78 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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States is the Electoral College, the unusual, and rather arcane, system that is used 
to select the President.430  It is doubtful that there are any textual or structural 
cognates in other constitutional democracies that would provide useful grounds 
for comparative reasoning about the formation and operation of the Electoral 
College, and it is doubtful that it would be appropriate, or for that matter, 
particularly helpful, for a U.S. court to look abroad for guidance in interpreting 
the constitutional rules governing Electoral College procedures.  The United 
States might well look to foreign or international precedent in deciding whether 
and how to amend the Electoral College provisions of our constitution, but as 
long as they are there, figuring out how they work is necessarily an exclusive 
domestic undertaking.431 
4. Legal Tradition 
Once one presses beyond text, structure, and unique political institutions, the 
grounds for selective exceptionalism become far more difficult to articulate, and 
the dangers of arbitrary or result-oriented exceptionalism increase substantially.  
Yet there is probably a fourth basis for legitimate exceptionalist claims that is 
grounded in a longstanding distinctive legal tradition and deeply rooted in a 
unique national culture.  This option, however, must be narrowly crafted in order 
to protect against the dangers of overly easy and overly inclusive assertion.  This 
Article suggests six limiting criteria.  At a minimum, the tradition should to be 
one which produces: (1) a clearly articulated exceptional principle; (2) that is 
reflected in a broad array of legal sources; (3) over a substantial period of 
national history; (4) showing a demonstrably unique response; (5) to a particular 
social issue; and (6) one that is deeply rooted in individuating national 
experience. This should not be an easy standard to satisfy, and the burden should 
be on the party or court relying on exceptionalism to demonstrate its existence. 
One example in the United States would be the tradition of separation of 
church and state referred to above. 432   The concept of religious non-
establishment is by no means unique to the United States.  Many other 
constitutional democracies prohibit the state from legislating on religious 
matters or overtly preferring a particular religious denomination as the 
established church.433  Thus there is little that is textually or structurally distinct 
                                                             
 430. AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE: STEPS IN CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT 10–15 (American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Walter Berns, ed. 1983). 
 431. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–14 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 
(discussing constitutional and statutory rules governing operation of Electoral College). 
 432. See, e.g., McCreary City. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228, 244–45 (1982). 
 433. See, e.g., AUSTL. CONST. s. 116 (“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for 
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or 
public trust under the Commonwealth”); Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“The State and the 
Catholic Church are independent and sovereign, each within its own sphere.”); CONST. (1987), art. 
III, sec. 5 (Phil.) (“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
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about the U.S. constitutional command.  Nevertheless, for the reasons alluded to 
above, the U.S. commitment to church-state separation is uniquely strong, and it 
has produced a jurisprudential tradition that arguably stands apart from law on 
similar questions in other countries.  It readily satisfies the six criteria for 
exception advanced above.434 
Another example might be U.S. attitudes toward personal bodily autonomy, 
which support a particularly strong notion of the rights of individuals to make 
basic medical decisions, including refusal of medically necessary forms of 
treatment.435  The right has an acknowledged constitutional dimension,436 but it 
also has roots in an exceptionally strong commitment to common-law principles 
of personal bodily autonomy and self-determination.437  It may also reflect deep-
seated U.S. libertarian instincts about the limits of governmental competence to 
make highly personal health care decisions.438  While some other constitutional 
democracies might share similar commitments, there are good reasons to believe 
that U.S. law on this subject has developed, and will continue to develop, a 
distinctly U.S. trajectory that allows for greater personal bodily autonomy than 
many other legal systems would be willing to tolerate.439  Here, nations may 
                                                             
free exercise thereof.  The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without 
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.  No religious test shall be required for the 
exercise of civil or political rights”); TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI MADDE 10 (Turkey) (the 
founding principles of the Republic of Turkey are secularism, social equality, and equality before 
law). 
 434. See supra Section III.B.4. 
 435. Mary Ann Baily, Futility, Autonomy, and Cost in End-of-Life Care, 39 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 172, 172 (2011) (“In decisions to forego medical treatment, autonomy is basic.  A mentally 
competent adult patient has a close to absolute moral and legal right to refuse treatment”). 
 436. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (assuming that principles 
of due process extend to medical patients, an autonomous right to refuse medical treatment exists). 
 437. Id. at 269. 
Before the turn of the century, this Court observed that ‘[n]o right is held more sacred, 
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’ 
Id. (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
 438. E.g., Baily, supra note 435, at 172–73. 
 439. See Naoki Kanaboshi, Competent Persons’ Constitutional Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment in the U.S. and Japan: Application to Japanese Law, 25 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 5, 6 
(2006) (exploring the scope of the right to refuse medical treatment in the United States and arguing 
that, despite contrary current interpretations of Japanese law, the principles applied in the United 
States should be incorporated into Japanese law and protected by the Japanese Constitution.).  Other 
nations have pressed further than the United States on some issues; see, e.g., Nurit Lev, The 
Legalization of Euthanasia: The Right to Die or the Duty to Die?, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 297, 297 (1995) (comparing “judicial and legislative attempts to define the legal status of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands, the first nation to sanction euthanasia, with the United States where 
momentum is growing for the legislation of physician-assisted suicide.”); see also Jennfier Fischer, 
A Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse Treatment for Involuntarily Hospitalized Persons with 
a Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 154 (comparing “how various countries 
and regions around the world have come out on the debate”). 
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share common commitments, but in the language of the European courts there 
must be a fairly wide “margin of appreciation” that allows divergence in the 
legal expression of a shared norm.440  Where a nation finds itself at one end or 
another of the spectrum, it may conclude with some justice that the laws and 
legal decisions of other nations are unlikely to be of much use. 
Consideration of exceptionalism based on legal tradition, however, highlights 
one of the key differences between selective and categorical exceptionalism.  
Under a selective approach, one must make a specific affirmative case for 
exception, and one must press the exception only as far as that case warrants.  
Thus, in the example of medical decision-making, the extent to which foreign or 
international law would be relevant should depend on an assessment of the 
relative strength or weakness of another legal system’s commitment to 
autonomous medical decision-making in the context of its own system for 
providing health care.  The same would be true for matters of church-state 
relations.  Some foreign sources might be excluded from consideration, but not 
necessarily all.  Some specific issues might be stronger candidates for 
exceptional treatment than others.  Under this approach, exceptionalism does not 
rule out consideration of foreign or international sources, but it does potentially 
limit which sources may be used, the extent to which they can be used, and the 
purposes for which their use is appropriate. 
C. The Values of Dialogue and Engagement 
What links all four proposed sources for selective exceptionalism, and 
distinguishes them all from the wholesale sort of exceptionalism reflected in 
most AFIL measures, is their collective commitment to dialogic interaction with 
foreign and international sources.  A selective approach does not reject foreign 
or international sources outright, but rather requires them to be considered, at 
least at a preliminary level, in order to determine whether they have relevance 
and, if so, to what degree.  Selectivity also requires making an affirmative case 
for deliberate differentiation between domestic and international or foreign 
norms, principles, and rules.  Selectivity, in other words, invites edifying 
discourse on the relation between domestic law and potential foreign or 
international counterparts.  It engages with foreign law, without necessarily 
accepting the relevance of foreign law in all cases.  It burdens a domestic 
adjudicator with the symmetrical responsibility to articulate a basis for either 
considering foreign and international sources, or excluding them.  In either 
                                                             
 440. The “margin of appreciation” doctrine, articulated in Handyside v. U.K., 24 Eur. Ct. H. 
R. (ser. A) para. 48 (1976), allows the European Court of Human Rights to take into account varying 
interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights in different member states due to 
cultural, historic and philosophical differences among member states.  See Emily Wada, A Pretty 
Picture: The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 275 (discussing implicit use of the margin of appreciation in Pretty v. United 
Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155 which upheld states’ authority to prohibit assisted suicide). 
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direction, this sort of dialogic engagement can be both edifying and illuminating 
for the development of domestic law.441 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, AFIL statutes are unlikely to have much success in stemming the 
tide of legal globalization.  As the twenty-first century unfolds, patterns of 
economic and social interaction across national boundaries will force 
progressive internationalization and globalization of law.442  If state courts are 
obliged to remain inhospitable to those developments, the parties whose 
economic and social needs dictate advancing globalization will find ways to 
navigate around the shoals of the AFIL restrictions.  The current spate of AFIL 
proposals may well reflect a kind of political nostalgia for a simpler time when 
sources of law were less complicated and courts did not need to think beyond 
local boundaries on any but a handful of legal questions.  As noted above, that 
nostalgia may rest partly on a misreading of legal history.443  But even if things 
were once that way, the AFIL movement is inconsistent with a present and future 
in which even the most ordinary kinds of legal practice are acquiring globalized 
character. 444   In the globalized legal world that is upon us, there is still 
                                                             
 441. Jackson, supra note 362, at 114. 
[C]onstitutional law can be understood as a site of engagement between domestic law 
and international or foreign legal sources and practices. On this view, the constitution’s 
interpreters do not treat foreign or international material as binding, or as presumptively 
to be followed.  But neither do they put on blinders that exclude foreign legal sources 
and experience.  Transnational sources are seen as interlocutors, offering a way of testing 
understanding of one’s own traditions by examining them in the reflection of others.’ 
Id.; Koh, supra note 229, at 56. 
Through a time-honored dialogic process, litigants, activists, publicists, and academic 
commentators seek to inform, influence, and improve this kind of judicial decision 
making. . . . it is precisely through this transnational legal process that interlinked rules of 
domestic and international law develop, and that interlinked processes of domestic and 
international compliance come about. 
Id.; Choudhry supra note 395, at 837. 
Comprehending a foreign legal system as being organized around a core set of normative 
and factual assumptions leads to a deeper understanding of that system.  But it also 
furthers legal self-understanding, because it invites the comparative lawyer, or the judge, 
to compare those assumptions against the assumptions that legal doctrine in her own 
system both reflects and constitutes. 
Id. 
 442. See Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. INT’L L.J. 
985, 988 (2009) (concluding that, “because the globalization of domestic constitutional law is 
inevitable, notions of separation of powers – or of legislative supremacy qualified by the existence 
of judicial review – will need to accommodate themselves to that globalization.”); David S. Law, 
Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277 (2008); Martin 
Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993). 
 443. See supra note 95. 
 444. Susan L. DeJarnatt & Mark C. Rahdert, Preparing for the Globalized Law Practice: The 
Need to Include International and Comparative Law in the Legal Writing Curriculum, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2010-10, 23–24 (2010) (citing survey of 
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substantial room for a carefully calibrated and articulated selective legal 
exceptionalism of the kind this Article has described.445  At least there should be 
some room for selective exceptionalism, because there is value in national legal 
diversity.  But efforts at categorical exceptionalism like the Oklahoma SOS 
Amendment and its AFIL progeny are ultimately undesirable, artificial barriers 































                                                             
Philadelphia Bar Association members in which 67.5% of respondents “reported that they had 
worked on a legal matter that required them to know something about foreign and/or international 
law.”). 
 445. See generally Koh, supra note 229. 
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